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Executive summary 
This empirical study explores revenue implications of different pricing techniques applied to 
movie rental via TV-provider (movie on demand). The problem statement is: 
What is the optimal pricing technique for movies on demand? How much of the area 
under demand curve can be captured by sophisticated pricing? 
The method used is quantitative research based on the data (12 726 individual movie 
valuations obtained from 479 participants) gathered in the survey conducted among 
Norwegian customers of a large international provider of TV-services (Canal Digital DTH). 
The collected data was fitted into a parametric distribution. Thereafter a dataset containing 
valuation data from 5000 simulated individuals was created. The dataset was used to 
compare revenue implications of such pricing alternatives as uniform pricing, component 
pricing, bundling and two-part tariff. The results of the study show that two-part tariff 
performs best of all the alternatives listed above. It allows producer to capture almost 60% of 
the area under demand curve. Such pricing techniques as component pricing and various 
forms of bundling do not raise producer surplus over 43%. In addition, this study discovered 
that customers have statistically significant different consumption patterns when it comes to 
movie rental. The consumption patterns differ by age, gender, the age of children in the 
household. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Report background 
1.1.1 What is video on demand? 
The last decade has brought changes into the way we consume TV-services. New 
technologies, such as development of digital cable, HD (high definition) have brought higher 
demands for quality of TV-products. A fierce competition among both TV-content producers 
and TV-service providers challenges the last to re-invent themselves and look for new ways 
to offer TV-products to their customers. On top of this, many customers opt to download 
pirated content. This activity has been made possible on a large scale by net-based 
technologies such as torrents
1
 and widely available online storage sites 
(http://www.economist.com/node/21543548). In response to the developing technology 
opportunity, competition and customer preferences, video on demand has appeared as an 
innovative way of providing TV-services. TV-based video on-demand includes a range of 
entertaining TV and video services that enables a customer to choose a movie or a TV show 
from a library of titles, start watching at any time, and pause/fast-forward/rewind as if they 
were watching a DVD. In telecommunication industry video on demand is denoted as a vast 
video library connected directly to one’s own television via a very high capacity electronic 
pipeline (Cermak, 1996). Stankeviciute (2004) points out that this type of services makes 
television a personalized medium so that a person does not depend on the broadcasters’ 
schedule. 
Video on demand has existed since the early 90s. The first commercially viable video on 
demand service emerged in Hong Kong around 1990, but didn’t succeed (Stankeviciute, 
2004). Most of the information one can find about video on demand concerns USA. The first 
“near video on-demand” trial there took place in 1992. This service would allow customers 
to choose time and date for watching a program or movie which was advertised particularly 
for this purpose. That is, the customer could not choose any movie or show from the library, 
                                               
1 Torrents are used for downloading/sharing data via, for instance, BitTorrent (bittorrent.org). A torrent 
contains data about the location of different pieces of the target file. Torrents divide the target file into small 
information chunks and in this way are able to download a large file quickly from an unlimited number of 
different hosts (http://bittorrent.org).  
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but was restricted to choose or not to choose the movie or show which was available for an 
additional payment during particular period of time. In 1994, video on demand in its present 
state came to the market. Unfortunately, the cost of infrastructure proved too high to support 
video on demand as a stand-alone service (Ludwigson, 2002). Moreover, the number of 
users was rather limited. However, the widespread use of the Internet catalyzed use of video 
on demand. Launch of the first complete video on demand in USA is dated to 1999 
(Stankeviciute, 2004). The launch of video on demand was later on followed by European 
providers. Since mid-2000 video on demand services have been available to European 
consumers via both PC and TV. The European video on demand industry has been 
particularly dynamic over the past ten years. According to 2009 data, on-demand views of 
paid content range from 1.5 to 3 per month per user (Meyer, 2009). 
The data presented by Meyer (2009) refers to video on demand in general. There are three 
most common formats for TV-based video on demand. Those are free video on demand, 
subscription- and pay-per-view video on demand. Free video on demand is offered as a part 
of TV-packages and does not require additional payment. Subscription video on demand 
implies an additional fee over a period of time for a particular quantity of TV-content 
provided on demand. Finally, pay-per-view video on demand implies a small fee for a 
program/movie selected by a customer. 
The TV-based video on demand service is available from BSkyB
2
, FOXTEL
3
, Telia, Viasat, 
Get, to name only a few. Among the leading providers of Internet-based video on demand 
are USA-based Netflix Inc. and Hulu.com. Netflix Inc. offers both flat rate online video 
rental in the United States and on demand video streaming over the Internet in the United 
States, Canada, Latin America, the Caribbean, United Kingdom and Ireland. Hulu.com is a 
website offering ad-supported on demand streaming video of TV shows and movies from 
several leading networks and studios in the United States. These services are at present 
offered only to users in Japan, the United States and its overseas territories. 
                                               
2 British Sky Broadcasting Group is a public satellite broadcasting company operating in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. 
3 FOXTEL is an Australian pay television company, operating cable, direct broadcast satellite television and 
IPTV services. 
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In other words, video on demand is gaining its place in the market. However, its revenue 
generating potential is debatable. It was long perceived as value-add for the existing 
customers rather than an independent revenue generator (Carey, 1999). On the other hand, 
Meyer (2009) predicts a rapid growth of the revenues from TV-based video on demand in 
the medium term.  
The most well known video on demand products are movies and TV-shows. In this study I 
will focus on movies provided on demand via TV.  
1.1.2 Movie on demand in Norway 
To my knowledge there is no available statistics showing the dynamics of on demand 
television services in Norway. However, a study conducted in 2007 in Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain and the UK (Meyer, 2009) has shown that the annual average growth rate for on 
demand TV had been 41% in the period from 2005 to 2007. DVD rental during the same 
period had been decreasing by 14% on average. In Norway, DVD rental has decreased from 
by 9,9% in the same period (http://medienorge.uib.no). While the decrease correlates with 
mainland Europe consumption of video on demand, the fall in rental may also reflect more 
illegal downloading, or the fact that DVD prices have dropped. Also, an increasing number 
of consumers may prefer to buy Blu-Rays rather than DVDs. 
In Norway video on demand has been provided for almost 10 years. The major players on 
TV-market, such as (Altibox, Canal Digital, Get, RiksTV, Viasat) offer different forms of 
this service. The price differs depending on the quality (high-definition vs. ordinary) and 
popularity of the movie. The price for a movie on demand varies from NOK 39 to NOK 79 
with some exceptions. Table 1 (Appendix 3) displays prices by selected providers of the 
movie rental on demand (both TV- and internet based). Viasat offers a month of chosen 
movies on demand (as a part of TV-subscription) for NOK 99. Moreover, this provider 
makes on demand services available on Apple devices. Swedish Voddler started operating in 
the Norwegian market in 2010. It is a commercial video on demand service providing both 
new and older movies. While the new movies are available only through subscription or pay-
per-view, the older and less popular ones are offered for free with advertisements. In October 
2011 Voddler launched a premium service offering access to around 4000 movie titles for 
NOK 79 per month. 
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One can conclude that providers apply uniform/component
4
 pricing and bundling when 
setting prices for their products. The practice of setting the price to NOK 39 or NOK 29 
instead of NOK 40 or NOK 30 respectively is known as psychological pricing. Besides, it 
seems that the providers of movies on demand practice market-based pricing. DVD 
distributors and DVD rental are their main competitors. Indeed, Cermak (1996) notes that 
video on demand have the strongest competitive relationship with rental video (Cermak, 
1996). On the other hand, Meyer (2009) points out that DVD purchase is a major competitor 
to TV-based video on demand. While both rental and on demand offer a product for one-
time consumption, DVD purchase offers in principle indefinite consumption, enabling the 
customer to watch the movie several times. Purchase is more reasonable, for instance, in 
families with small children, who like to watch the same movie several times. On the other 
hand, it is also a normal practice to buy a movie to watch it once. It is particularly relevant 
for rather older movies, when sales price is not very different from rental price. However, the 
nature of consumption taken into consideration, DVD rental seems to be a closer competitor 
to video on demand.  
Competitions in the market together with high fixed costs create a number of challenged for 
TV services provided on demand. 
1.1.3 Challenges of video on demand 
It is possible to identify three most significant challenges faced by video on demand 
industry. Firstly, it is the novelty of the product compared to its main competitors. Indeed, 
the survey conducted as a part of this study revealed that most of TV customers are still 
unfamiliar with video on demand (see Chapter 3). At the same time, the competitive 
products such as DVD rental and DVD purchase are well known and widely used. So, even 
though home TV-based movie rental seems so much more convenient than any other 
alternative, its place in the market is still not significant (Stankevichute, 2004). Indeed, in 
2011 Norwegian TV provider Altibox (Lyse) made known that it rents out 6 movies on 
average per subscriber per year (private source). 
Secondly, there is a challenge of deriving profit from selling movies on demand. It leads to 
the question of the right business model for this type of services. Thus, Jagannathan, 
                                               
4 See section 1.6 Terminology for definitions of uniform pricing and component pricing. 
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Srinivasan, Nayak, Almeroth and Hofmann (2002) point out that in spite of the interest in 
video on demand, commercial efforts have not been successful. The lack of a good business 
model is named as a possible reason (Jagannathan et al. 2002, Basu and Little 2000). Also 
Stankeviciute (2004) notes the challenge of earning money by selling video on demand . She 
singles out several components of the problem. Firstly, there is a question of how to attract 
advertisers to invest ad dollars into this type of service. At the same time there is a problem 
that engaging of advertisers might reduce the attractiveness of the service to the customers. 
As a result, dollars gained from advertisers would reduce the revenue from the customers. 
Secondly, there is an issue of release windows. Release window denotes a period of time 
when a distribution channel has the exclusive right to sell the movie. Thus, normally a movie 
is first shown in the cinema while no other viewing is available for approximately 3 months. 
After a short break when the movie is not available at all it becomes available for home use, 
typically rental first, followed by sales. After that the movie is available as TV-based video 
on demand service. Only after that it will appear first on the pay cable, basic cable and 
finally will be available for broadcasting over the most basic channels 
(http://www.economist.com). For video on demand providers it means that people could 
have seen the movie in the cinema or on DVD before it is available as video on demand and 
might no longer be interested in it. 
Finally, the available information about consumption of video on demand is rather limited. It 
is difficult to find consumption statistics. The information about sales volumes and revenue 
generated is not always available, which makes it difficult to conduct a research on actual 
business data. Moreover, the customers’ expected consumption of this service and their 
willingness to pay is rather difficult to reveal. The industry seems to undertake a trial and 
error method to gradually find the optimal solution. 
1.2 Relevance 
The phenomenon of video on demand is relatively new. During the last decades it has been 
attracting research interest (Jagannathan et al.2002, Cermak 1996, Meyer 2009, Basu and 
Little 2000).  However, the number of studies concerning pricing approaches to providing 
these services is rather limited. As pointed out earlier, it is difficult to reveal the customers’ 
expected consumption and their willingness to pay for video on demand services. This 
information is, however, of particular importance for price-setting decisions. 
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The present study provides an empirical look at the problem of pricing of on demand 
services. The survey executed as a part of this study reveals consumers’ preferences for 
movie rental and movie consumption in general. Furthermore, the survey reveals customers’ 
willingness to pay for movies on demand. Thus, the aim of the research is two-folded. First 
and foremost, as determined in the problem statement, the aim is to find the optimal pricing 
alternative for movies on demand. The second goal is to get additional information about 
consumers’ preferences and prospective demand for the services by means of a customer 
survey. 
This study is important as a contribution to the research on pricing of such innovative 
services as TV-based video on demand. Of course, the challenges of video on demand are far 
from limited to the correct pricing of the movies. The challenges also include composition of 
the on demand product as well as defining the business model. But the aspect of pricing is an 
important element in the discussion of the correct business model for deriving profit from 
selling this type of services. 
1.3 Problem statement 
The problem statement is as follows: 
What is the optimal pricing technique for movies on demand? How much of the area 
under demand curve can be captured by sophisticated pricing? 
This problem statement will be addressed in three steps. Firstly, a selected number of pricing 
techniques will be studied theoretically. Secondly, the results of the survey conducted among 
the customers of a large international provider of TV services will be presented and 
discussed. The purpose of the survey was to elicit customers’ willingness to pay for movies 
on demand. The data obtained in the survey will be analyzed by applying several pricing 
techniques. Finally, main findings will be identified and discussed. 
1.4 About the study 
This study is inspired by the work of Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) “Music for a Song: An 
Empirical Look at Uniform Pricing and its Alternatives”. The subject of this academic work 
is digital music, rather than video. Shiller and Waldfogel explore the profit and welfare 
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implications of various pricing alternatives, including song-specific pricing, various forms of 
bundling, two-part tariff, nonlinear pricing, and third-degree price discrimination. They use 
survey-based data on students’ valuations of popular songs. 
The current study adopts the methodology of the work mentioned above. The data for the 
research was collected with the help of an online survey. The raw data was thereafter fitted 
into a parametric distribution. Then a dataset containing valuation data from 5000 simulated 
individuals was created. Further analysis was conducted on the simulated data. However, 
there are several differences between the work by Shiller and Waldfogel and the current 
study. Firstly, a different target group was chosen. While Shiller and Waldfogel performed 
their survey among students, the respondents of the current study were customers of a large 
provider of TV services, Canal Digital DTH. Secondly, the questions of the survey were 
adapted to the subject of the study, which are movies. For example, I included poster 
pictures in order to present the products (movies) visually. Furthermore, the movie titles 
where divided into categories so that each respondent could choose a category he/she was 
most interested in. For comparison, Shiller and Waldfogel suggested a list of 50 the same 
song titles to all the respondents. Thirdly, while analysing pricing alternatives I limited this 
study to uniform pricing, component pricing, product bundling and two-part tariff. As 
mentioned above, the study by Shiller and Waldfogel also includes nonlinear pricing and 
third-degree price discrimination. My choice to limit the number of alternatives is based on 
the practical considerations. That is, such alternatives as nonlinear pricing or third-degree 
price discrimination would be difficult to implement in the case of this study.  
1.5 Structure 
The current study has six chapters, but can be divided into three main parts. Part one 
(Chapters 1-2) contains the introduction, aims of the study as well as the theoretical 
perspectives relevant for pricing alternatives used in this study. In part two (Chapters 3-4) 
the research methodology is explained. It includes the description of survey design and 
execution. The general results of the survey are presented in detail after explanation of the 
assumptions behind the questionnaire. Presentation of the results is followed by analysis of 
the data. Initially, the process of fitting the data into parametric distribution is explained. 
Thereafter, the application of different pricing techniques is presented. The last and third part 
(Chapters 5-6) includes discussion, conclusions and limitations. In discussion, the findings 
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are evaluated in the light of the theory presented in the study.  At the same time, the research 
methodology is examined critically. Conclusions sum up the main findings and outline 
possibilities for the further research, while the limitations refine the scope of the study. 
Finally, figures and tables as well as output and commands from statistical software 
(MINITAB and STATA) are presented in the Appendix. 
1.6 Terminology 
The purpose of this section is to explain the use of terminology in the study. It seems 
necessary for the following reason. Some of the notions used here were adopted from other 
works and it would be reasonable to clarify their original meaning. Some of the terms are 
known to have a wider meaning (or several meanings) then intended in this study. Hence, 
there is a need to specify the meaning in which they are used here. Finally, some of the terms 
are applied interchangeably in the literature. In this section I present those I’ve chosen to use 
in the study, so as to limit confusion. 
Uniform pricing: a term adopted from the work by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). It denotes 
the practice of charging the same price to all customers for the same product. The price is the 
same regardless of the quantity purchased. 
Component pricing: a term adopted from the work by Chu, Chenguan, Leslie, and 
Sorenson (2009). They define component pricing as a pricing alternative under which a firm 
sets different prices to each of the products. For instance, the practice of component pricing 
would be to set a different price to each movie title. For the record, the same term is used in 
the work by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). 
Individual movie valuations: individual movie valuation (or willingness to pay) denotes the 
amount a respondent states as the amount he/she is willing to pay for a movie. 
Pricing techniques or pricing alternatives: Uniform pricing, component pricing, bundling 
and two-part tariff are the pricing techniques I focus on in this study. In the literature one 
finds the following terms: pricing approaches, pricing schemes and pricing models, pricing 
strategies, pricing methods and pricing techniques. These terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably. I consider pricing technique an appropriate term for the current study. 
According to Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (2003) technique denotes “a 
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special way of doing something”. Thus, in the current study pricing technique signifies a 
special way of setting prices. In order to make the use of terminology clear I am going to use 
the notion pricing techniques or pricing alternatives referring to uniform pricing, component 
pricing, bundling and two-part tariff.  
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2. Theoretical perspective  
The aim of this chapter is to provide theoretical framework for this study. The theoretical 
aspects of pricing are quite extensive. They include microeconomic, strategic and marketing 
perspectives as well as mathematical modelling approaches to price setting. In this study I 
focus on the microeconomic aspect of pricing . That is, the breakdown of the area under 
demand curve is of special interest, producer surplus share in particular. Further, the study 
focuses on the impact different pricing alternatives have on this breakdown. 
This chapter will provide theoretical perspective for addressing the problem statement: 
Which pricing technique is optimal for movies on demand? How much of the area 
under demand curve can be captured by sophisticated pricing? 
Firstly, I present the general aspects of pricing. Thereafter I suggest a closer look at the 
following pricing techniques: uniform pricing, component pricing, bundling, and two-part 
tariff.  
2.1 Pricing: an introduction 
Economic theory treats price in a wide sense of the word. It refers both to the amount 
charged for goods or services sold and salary as the price for labor. I will here focus on the 
price as consideration for the goods and services.  
Further, microeconomics describes how the prices are determined. It focuses particularly on 
the interaction of supply and demand. The theory asserts that in a free market economy the 
price is set so that it equates the quantity supplied with the quantity demanded. The 
discussion about price as an interaction of supply and demand leads inevitably to the 
question of its impact on the benefits of the parties, i.e. producer surplus and consumer 
surplus. Producer surplus for a firm, as defined by Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2005), is the 
difference between the market price of the goods and the marginal cost of their production. 
Consumer surplus is denoted as the difference between what a customer is willing to pay and 
what he/she actually pays. In case there is net loss of any of the surpluses (or both) one states 
dead weight loss. One often talks about external factors which influence the breakdown of 
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the surplus, such as government controls, taxes or subsidies. Since this is not directly 
relevant to the current study I choose to skip this topic.  
As market conditions are normally far from equilibrium, it is natural that producers are 
interested to capture as much of the consumer surplus as possible. But in this situation single 
price is not good enough. One should charge different prices to different customers in order 
to transfer customer surplus to the producer. This practice of charging different prices for the 
same product is known as price discrimination. There are known three main types of it: first-
, second-, and third-degree price discrimination. First-degree price discrimination implies 
charging each customer his/her reservation price, that is, the maximum price he/she is 
willing to pay. Implementing of this type of price discrimination would be rather difficult in 
practice. Second-degree price discrimination implies charging different price dependent on 
the quantity of goods purchased. Quantity discount is a well-known example of this. Finally, 
third-degree price discrimination means charging different price to different customer 
groups. Student or senior discounts are the examples of this type of price discrimination. In 
addition, there are other ways of appropriating customer surplus. Among them one normally 
mentions such techniques as two-part tariff and product bundling. Two-part tariff implies 
using an initial fee (so called hookup fee) for the access to the product, and the usage fee for 
the direct use of the products or services. Bundling normally denotes practice of selling two 
or more goods together for one price. I will return to two-part tariff and product bundling 
later in this chapter. 
So far I’ve been focusing on the microeconomic aspects of pricing. Now I would like to 
examine some practical approaches to price setting. Traditionally one distinguishes three 
approaches to pricing: cost-plus, market based and value based (Phillips, 2005). Under cost-
plus approach the price is determined by adding a surcharge to the cost of product. Market 
based pricing relies on the prices of competitors for determining the own price. Value based 
pricing relies on the customers value of the product for setting the price. Cost-plus is based 
on cost accounting while the other two have a very close connection to marketing.  
The companies often combine the approaches mentioned above. While doing so they choose 
a pricing strategy to achieve their goals, for instance to increase their revenue, expand 
market share and so on. The pricing strategy might change in different points of time. Price 
discrimination, mentioned over in this chapter is often referred to as a pricing strategy.  
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Finally, I will introduce the pricing technique which is used as a benchmark in this study. 
Uniform pricing denotes charging the same price for the same product (Shiller and 
Waldfogel, 2009). Any of the pricing approaches mentioned above could be applied here: 
cost-plus, market or value based. This technique represents the simplest pricing structure 
which does not take into consideration customer preferences and different reservation prices.  
In the next sections I will examine the selected pricing alternatives: uniform pricing, product 
bundling and two-part tariff. 
2.2 Pricing alternatives 
2.2.1 Uniform pricing and component pricing 
As mentioned above, uniform pricing is perhaps one of the simplest pricing techniques. It 
implies charging the same price for the same product to all the customers. Uniform price 
assures linear relationship between revenue and quantities sold. It is therefore easy to use 
this pricing technique in models. It is normally the default option in microeconomic models. 
The purpose of such models is typically to find a profit-maximizing price for a single price 
monopoly.  
Uniform pricing is also widely used in practice. But with uniform pricing in mind one should 
distinguish between homogeneous and heterogeneous (or differentiated) goods. In the first 
case one considers charging the same price for the identical goods, while in the second case 
the same price is set for goods which are different from each other. The practice of applying 
uniform pricing to differentiated goods has been criticized in the literature. Thus, Orbach and 
Einav (2007) studied use of uniform pricing in the movie theatres. That is, they considered 
movies differentiated goods. Orbach and Einav presented demand patterns for different 
movies as differentiated goods and suggested corresponding ticket pricing policies. They 
conclude that the use of uniform pricing is unreasonable when the goods are heterogeneous. 
Orbach and Einav are not alone in their criticism of uniform pricing as applied to 
heterogenous goods. McMillan (2007) criticised the use of uniform pricing in retail. Such 
researchers as Mitchell and Vogelsang (2001), Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) refer to a 
number of studies proving that a larger part of consumer surplus can be appropriated by 
using more sophisticated alternatives to this pricing technique. It seems reasonable because 
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taking into consideration consumer preferences and reservation prices would allow 
extracting more of consumer surplus. One could argue that any type of price discrimination 
would increase producer surplus, compared to the uniform pricing. It would do so by 
capturing some of the consumer surplus which was not available under uniform pricing. It 
seems a reasonable claim as long as the revenue-maximizing uniform price stays the lowest 
limit for pricing decisions. For instance, if a customer’s reservation price is higher than the 
revenue-maximizing uniform price, there is a potential to capture more revenue from this 
customer. For this reason he/she should be identified and charged a different (higher) price. 
If, however, a sophisticated pricing scenario results in charging a set of prices starting from 
below the revenue-maximizing uniform price, it might lead to loosing of the customer 
surplus available under uniform pricing. For instance, this could happen if customers or 
customer groups are poorly differentiated and the mechanism of charging them different 
prices does not work. Consumers would then choose the lowest price and even more of 
customer surplus would go lost for the producer. However, the design of sophisticated 
pricing schemes including price discrimination is aimed at extracting more consumer surplus 
by charging more to the customers who have a reservation price higher than the revenue-
maximizing uniform price. It is therefore not likely that the producer would go below 
uniform price while designing the scheme. There are numerous alternatives to the uniform 
pricing which are designed to appropriate more of consumer surplus. 
One of the simplest alternative to the uniform pricing is component pricing. The concept  of 
component pricing is normally used in several meanings. It denotes, among other meanings, 
a practice of valuing a product according to the value of its components 
(http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org). In this study, however, I’m going to use the 
definition by Chu, Chenguan, Leslie, and Sorenson (2009). They determine component 
pricing as a pricing alternative when a firm sets different prices on each of the products. To 
understand in which way it is different to uniform pricing one should think of such products 
as online music, movie rental or movie purchase. One could charge all the songs/movies a 
single price. However, there is also an option of charging a different price for each of the 
songs/movies. The last option would be component pricing. Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) 
point out that uniform pricing is a constrained special case of component pricing. That is, it 
could be considered a case of component pricing where all the prices should be the same. 
Thus, component pricing per definition should not perform worse than its constrained 
alternative.  
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However, component pricing would still belong to the simple pricing techniques. In the next 
section I will take a look at product bundling which has long been claimed to perform better 
than simple uniform pricing. 
2.2.2 Product bundling 
Bundling was considered an alternative to uniform pricing already in 1963 (Stigler, 1963). It 
is known as the strategy of offering several products or services for a single price (Odlyzko, 
2001). One distinguishes pure bundling and mixed bundling. Pure bundling is conventionally 
defined as selling products only as a package (Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 2009). Mixed 
bundling, however, allows selling both as package and individually. Bundling is normally 
used in industries where customers have heterogeneous demands and when the firm cannot 
price discriminate. In the last case the reason can be the lack of knowledge about customer 
preferences or difficulties in differentiating customer groups. 
Bundling was suggested by Stigler (1963) who discussed block booking
5
 of the movies. 
Adams and Yellen (1976) introduced mixed bundling and proved that it performs better than 
pure bundling. It is emphasized that for bundling to succeed, the demand for the products 
sold in a bundle should be negatively correlated (Stigler 1963, Adams and Yellen 1976, 
Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 2009). However, Schmalensee (1984) showed that bundling can be an 
optimal pricing alternative even when correlation between reservation prices in the 
population is not negative. Furthermore, McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) 
considered a model for multiproduct oligopoly and proved that bundling is always an 
optimal strategy as long as reservation values are independently distributed in the population 
of consumers.  
Bundling has been proved the optimal pricing technique for the low marginal cost products 
when consumers have the same probability distribution for reservation values (Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson, 1999). Further, Hitt and Chen (2003) studied the problem of bundling in the 
situation when customers have different willingness to pay (heterogeneous demand). They 
explored the concept of customized bundling, that is, a type of bundling which gives 
                                               
5 Block booking - a practice among motion picture distributors of contracting with an exhibitor to show a 
predetermined series of films (http://dictionary.reference.com/). In other words it implies selling several movies 
as a unit instead of allowing exhibitor to choose the movies they wish to show. 
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consumers the right to choose a number of goods from a larger set to a fixed price. The 
researchers proved this type of bundling to be an efficient pricing alternative in the situations 
where consumers have heterogeneous preferences.  
In the next two sections I will discuss two types of bundling, i.e. pure bundling and mixed 
bundling. I will thereafter discuss a special version of bundling, denoted by Shiller and 
Waldfogel (2009) as bundle-size pricing. 
2.2.2.1 Pure Bundling 
Pure bundling is the basic bundling alternative which offers two or more products only as a 
package. A two-product bundle was suggested by Stigler (1963) who pointed out that 
negative correlations in customers’ reservation prices allow a seller to capture more revenue. 
As mentioned before, Schmalensee (1984) later showed that pure bundling can increase 
revenue even when reservation prices are positively correlated.  
The studies by Stigler and Schmalensee considered bundles consisting of two products. Later 
there was done a research on multiproduct bundles (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999). Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson conducted a study on information goods (such as software, music 
photographs, video clips and research reports) with a multiproduct monopolist in mind. The 
researchers argued that bundling of a large quantity of unrelated informational goods can 
substantially increase profits. They also pointed out the favourability of this alternative 
because large bundles increase customer valuation of the unit. Among others who worked on 
bundling of information goods was Fishburn (2000). He noticed that bundling is particularly 
relevant for this type of goods because of negligible marginal cost. Fishburn notes that while 
uniform pricing seems to be the alternative used by newcomers in the market, bundling is 
likely to be chosen by the established producers of information goods. Furthermore, Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson (2000) argue that aggregation strategies including bundling will both 
increase profits and contribute to the distribution of the information goods as long as the 
marginal cost is low and consumer groups do not differ systematically in their valuations of 
the products. 
Numerous studies indicate that bundling is a favourable strategy for low-cost goods. 
Negative correlation of demands for the goods offered in bundle is also a desirable 
condition. However, if these conditions do not hold a possible solution could still be found in 
mixed bundling. 
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2.2.2.2 Mixed Bundling 
While pure bundling offers two or more goods only as a package, mixed bundling denotes a 
choice between buying a bundle and buying goods separately. Economic literature points out 
advantages of mixed bundling compared to pure bundling. Indeed, Pindyk and Rubinfeld 
(2009) consider mixed bundling an ideal strategy when demands are only somewhat 
negatively correlated and /or when marginal production costs are significant. Furthermore, 
Adams and Yellen (1979) who introduced this bundling alternative, proved it to be more 
profitable than either pure bundling or product-specific pricing. Schmalensee (1984), in his 
turn, concludes that “mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and 
unbundled sales, and it’s generally strictly more profitable than either”.  
The examples of this bundling alternative can be found, among other industries, in sport or 
retail. Thus, one could buy a season ticket or tickets to individual football game. Computers 
can be offered with bundled software; hardware and software can also be sold separately 
(Perloff, 2003). 
Bundling as a pricing technique allows more variations than pure bundling and mixed 
bundling. One of its particular variants, bundle-size pricing, is presented in the next section. 
2.2.2.3 Bundle-size pricing 
Bundle-size pricing was introduced by Chu et al. (2009). This type of bundling involves 
setting different prices for bundles of different size. In other words, it can be considered a 
variant of mixed bundling which offers bundles of different size alongside with the 
possibility of buying goods separately. The study by Chu et al. (2009) suggests a pricing 
scheme under which, for instance, for a company with three goods, one price is set for the 
purchase of a single good, a second price for the purchase of any two goods, and a third price 
for purchasing all three. The study argues that this pricing alternative is more profitable than 
component pricing mentioned above. Furthermore, Chu et al. (2009) shows that it tends to 
attain nearly the same level of profits as mixed bundling in a broad range of demand and cost 
scenarios. Indeed, the flexibility of this alternative indicates that it has a potential to extract 
more consumer surplus than its less sophisticated alternatives. 
Some similarities with bundling can also be found in the pricing technique discussed in the 
next section, namely two-part tariff.  
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2.2.3 Two-part tariff 
The pricing alternative discussed in this section can be considered a special case of pure 
bundling. Two-part tariff implies a form of pricing in which consumers are charged both a 
hookup (entry) fee T and a per-unit price (usage fee) p (Pyndik and Rubinfeld, 2009). Thus, 
a two-part tariff with p=0 would correspond to pure bundling described earlier. Two-part 
tariff is also sometimes referred to as nonlinear pricing. Thus, Mitchell and Vogelsang 
(2001) include description of two-part tariff into the section where they consider nonlinear 
tariffs. Moreover, they refer to it as the simplest example of nonlinear tariff. It makes sense, 
provided the definition of nonlinear pricing given by Wilson (1993). With the term 
“nonlinear pricing” he refers to any case in which the tariff is not strictly proportional to the 
quantity purchased. Obviously, the two-part tariff is not strictly proportional to the quantity 
purchased. Of course, one might argue that with a low entrance fee and large quantity of the 
purchased goods and services, a two part tariff can be almost proportional to the quantity 
purchased or at least close to it. In any case, this is a form of price discrimination, as pointed 
out by Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2009). As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, price 
discrimination implies charging different prices for the same product. This is exactly what 
happens while using two-part tariff. Even though entrance fee and the unit price is the same 
for all customers, the amount paid for each unit in fact varies with the number of units 
purchased. That is why one of the main challenges of this pricing alternative is to set the 
hookup fee and the per-unit price correctly. The size of the fees depends on the customer 
consumption and it is important to set the fees so that one gets as much of the surplus of 
large customers as possible at the same as small customers are still willing to pay for the 
products. 
This type of price discrimination occurs in partially or fully monopolistic markets or in the 
markets where consumers are uncertain about their future demand (Heyes, 1987). Among the 
most typical areas of application of two-part tariffs one could name sports clubs, amusement 
parks and cellular phone services. 
2.3 Conclusive remarks 
In this chapter I have presented selected theoretical concepts of pricing. Initially a number of 
key microeconomic aspects were discussed. After that the pricing alternatives relevant for 
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this study were presented. I started off with uniform pricing and moved towards more 
sophisticated techniques such as bundling and two-part tariff. The intuition which follows 
from the presented theory indicates that such pricing alternatives as bundling (mixed 
bundling and bundle-size pricing in particular) and two-part tariff have a potential to perform 
significantly better than uniform pricing. In the next sections of this study I will test this 
intuition on the survey data. In addition, I will explore the quantitative implication of the 
alternatives. That is, I will assess the size of the potential gain while using alternative pricing 
techniques and find which pricing alternative performs best (on the survey data) with respect 
to the potential revenue. 
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3. Research methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research methodology of the current study. 
Firstly, the research design is described. Then the information gathering technique is 
presented in detail. Finally, the results of information gathering are presented and discussed. 
3.1 Research design 
Research design is the general plan of how to answer the research question (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009). One can choose between two approaches to the research: 
inductive and deductive. The first one involves development of a theory as a result of the 
observation of empirical data. Deductive approach, on the contrary, tests theory against the 
empirical data. In the current study I exploit deductive approach. That is, I test the intuition 
of economic theory against the empirical data gathered in the survey. 
Furthermore, one distinguishes the following purposes of a study: exploratory, descriptive, 
and explanatory. Explanatory studies establish casual relationships between variables. 
Exploratory studies seek new insights into phenomena. Descriptive studies focus on 
portraying of an object, but do not necessarily go far to draw conclusions. Such a study can 
be a part of an explanatory or exploratory study. The current study has an exploratory 
purpose as it focuses on the new insights into pricing of information goods.  
As for collecting and analysing of the empirical data, one can choose between quantitative 
and qualitative techniques. The choice depends on whether one exploits an analytical 
approach to understand a few controlled variables or a systematic approach to understand 
many variables in a complex situation (Salomon, 1991). Qualitative methods provide 
detailed information about a limited number of persons or cases and rely on non-numerical 
data. Quantitative methods, however, often include surveys and are especially suitable to 
estimate reactions of a large number of people, identify similarities, differences and causal 
relationships based on the answers. To answer the research question of the current study it’s 
important that I rely on quantitative data. The purpose of this study is to quantify revenue 
implications of different pricing alternatives and find the optimal one. It makes the analysis 
dependent on the quantitative data as well as quantitative analysing procedures. 
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Quantitative data can be obtained in various ways. Most often, those ways are experiment or 
survey (Saunders, 2009). To gather the data necessary to give a quantitative answer to the 
research question of the current study I have chosen to use a survey. Survey involves 
structured gathering of data from a sizeable population. Data collected by the survey is 
standardized and thus allows easy comparison. Moreover, it is suitable for producing models 
of the relationships between variables. Since I am interested in modelling revenue 
implications of different pricing techniques, a survey suits the purpose of my study. 
Furthermore, a survey is normally associated with a deductive approach and tends to be used 
for exploratory research (Saunders, 2009). As mentioned above, a deductive approach as 
well as an exploratory purpose has been chosen for answering the research question of the 
current study. 
3.2 Information gathering 
The purpose of information gathering in this study is to reveal the customers’ willingness to 
pay for rental of selected movies via TV provider. Willingness to pay reflects the amount a 
customer is willing to offer to buy a product or a service (Horowitz and McConnel, 2002). 
This concept has been studied for about 30 years (Nysveen and Pedersen, 2004). 
Werthenbroch and Skiera (2002) describe the following methods to estimate willingness to 
pay: the transaction method,  the Vickrey auction method; the Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak’s (BDM) method, amd the survey method. 
Under the transaction method, the price is manipulated, and the respondents choose to buy 
the product or not for each alternative of the price. The Vickrey auction method, in turn, is 
based on the auction principle, where respondents take part in a sealed-bid auction and the 
respondent with highest bid has to buy the product. The BDM method reveals willingness to 
pay at the point of purchase (Werthenbroch and Skiera, 2002).  
Finally, the survey method includes three alternative approaches. It can be: 1) based on 
conjoint analysis; 2) based on contingent valuation with a close-ended approach; 3) based on 
contingent valuation with an open ended approach. Under conjoint analysis several product 
attributes (price, quality etc.) are manipulated and the respondents are asked to rank the 
alternatives. Under contingent valuation with a close-ended approach the respondents choose 
to buy a product or not when the price is given. Applying an open ended approach means 
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that the respondents are asked to state their willingness to pay for a given product 
(Werthenbroch and Skiera, 2002). 
For this study I have chosen a survey method with an open ended approach. This choice was 
made for the following reasons. Firstly, using an open ended approach makes sure that the 
respondents state their own reservation price without being influenced by given alternatives. 
Secondly, survey method is relatively simple and inexpensive to perform. Weaknesses and 
possible pitfalls of the method will be addressed in Chapter 5.  
3.3 Survey 
The survey was conducted during the weeks 19-21 in 2011. To perform the survey, I’ve used 
Internet-based service Questback (www.questback.no) which allows creating and managing 
online surveys. Respondents were asked to participate in the survey by invitation text sent to 
their e-mail addresses. The respondents were offered an incentive. Those who chose to 
participate in the survey were offered a possibility to win a payment-free month on their TV 
subscription. The respondents were encouraged to leave their e-mail addresses in case they 
wanted to participate in random drawing of the winner of the payment-free month. 352 
respondents left their e-mail addresses. After the survey was closed, three respondents were 
chosen randomly to be rewarded by a payment-free month on their TV subscription. 
Norwegian was used as the survey language since all of the respondents were customers of a 
Norwegian TV provider and residing in Norway.     
3.3.1 Target group 
For the survey there was chosen a random selection of subscribers to television services. The 
customer information was kindly provided by a large international telecommunication 
company (Canal Digital DTH). This study is being performed in cooperation with this 
company. The ambition was therefore to get a representative selection for the customer base 
of Canal Digital DTH. 
3.3.2 Questionnaire 
The purpose of the survey was to elicit respondents’ willingness to pay for movie rental via 
their TV provider. The respondents were presented a number of movie titles. Each movie 
title was accompanied by a poster picture of the respective movie and a short description of 
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the plot. There was also given a short information about the director, starring actors, 
production company and the year of release. The survey included 75 movie titles. The titles 
were divided into five categories: action, comedy, drama, family, and thriller.  Each category 
included 15 titles. The respondents were asked to choose the category they were most 
interested in. It was also possible to choose several categories. Participants was given the 
following guidance: 
I neste del blir det presentert en rekke filmtitler. Filmtitlene er delt inn i 5 kategorier. Velg 
kategorien du er interessert i. Det er mulig å velge flere kategorier.  
 
NB! En kategori inneholder 15 filmtitler og det tar ca. 10-13 min. å gå gjennom disse. 
Velger du flere kategorier, kan det ta lengre tid å besvare undersøkelsen. 
 
Du er bedt om å angi det MAKSIMALE beløpet (i NOK) du er villig til å betale for å LEIE 
denne filmen direkte til din TV fra en LOVLIG kilde. Tenk deg at du ikke eier denne filmen 
og at den blir tilgjengelig med en gang du vil se den.  
 
Skriv hvor mye filmen er verdt for DEG, ikke beløpet du tenker er rettferdig eller vanlig å 
betale.  
 
Hvis du ikke er interessert i å se denne filmen skriv 0.  
I have obtained 12 726 observations of individual movie valuations, 7 382 of which were 
zeros (58%). It gives 12 726 - 7 382 = 5 344 positive individual valuations. 
To make sure the stated willingness to pay was correct I included several control questions. 
Firstly, the respondents were asked about their preferred way of watching movies. The 
respondents were suggested the following alternatives: cinema, DVD/Blue-ray purchase, 
DVD/Blue-ray rental, paid streaming from the Internet, free downloading from the Internet, 
video on demand by TV provider, ordinary television (relatively old movies broadcasted free 
of charge, as opposed to paid movie channel or on demand rental).  If, for instance, a 
respondent stated that his/her preferred way to watch movies was ordinary television, there 
was a reason to believe that the stated willingness to pay for movies on demand would be 
overestimated.  
 29 
Secondly, the respondents were asked how often they: 1) go to the movies, 2) buy movies on 
DVD/Blue-ray, 3) rent movies on DVD/Blue-ray, 4) rent movies via their TV provider. The 
answers to these questions were used to double check the answers about preferred way of 
watching movies. That is, if a respondent, for instance, stated that his/her preferred way of 
watching movies was DVD/Blue-ray rental, it was made sure that the respective person 
stated that he/she rents movies at least as often as he/she goes to the cinema or buys 
DVD/Blue-ray. No major discrepancies were noticed in the data, that is, the above stated 
was correct for all the answers. 
In addition, the respondents were asked how much on average they spend monthly on: 1) 
cinema, 2) DVD/Blue-ray purchase, 3) movie rental. This information was used to form an 
idea about the general level of spending on movie consumption of the respective person. The 
stated willingness to pay of every respondent was compared to the stated monthly level of 
spending. In case of obvious discrepancies the stated willingness to pay was deemed 
overestimated. Thus, I removed observations obtained from 9 respondents (240 individual 
movie valuations) from the set as the stated willingness to pay was contradicting the stated 
level of spending on the movie consumption. These respondents stated that they would be 
willing to pay NOK 100 to NOK 250 for selected movie titles while the average monthly 
expenditure on purchase as well as rent of DVD/Blue-ray was stated below NOK 100 or 
zero. In addition, these respondents reported that they seldom buy movies on DVD/Blue-ray, 
seldom or never rent movies. All this indicates that the willingness to pay in these cases is 
most probably overstated. 
The survey contained general questions concerning TV consumption of the respondents, 
such as number of channels they were subscribers to and frequency of TV watching per day. 
The respondents were also explicitly asked whether they have ever used video on demand 
service by their TV provider. For those who answered this question negatively it was 
followed by the question about their intention to use these services in future. These questions 
were included because the answers to them were of interest for the company. At the 
questionnaire respondents were asked to answer general questions about their age, sex, 
income, quantity and age of children (if any). The survey questions are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
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3.3.2.1 Choice of movie titles 
As mentioned before, the movie titles included in the survey consisted of 75 titles divided 
into 5 categories: action, comedy, drama, family and thriller. Each of the categories 
contained 15 titles. Approximately five of those were movies shown in the cinema at the 
moment when the survey was executed. Another five were recent DVD/blue-ray releases; 
the last five were selected among the movies released within the time span of 1-2 years back 
from the moment of survey. Movies released after 2009 were not included into the list. This 
choice was based on the following reasoning. Firstly, the demand for the movie rental is 
believed to be driven by the new movies. That is why the potential buyers would be 
interested in newer releases they haven’t seen before. Secondly, in most cases a movie is a 
product which is normally consumed once. There are, of course, cases when favourite 
movies are being re-watched several times (for instance, movies and cartoons for children). 
It is, however, reasonable to think that in these cases one would prefer to acquire a copy of 
the respective movie rather than rent it several times. It is therefore natural to assume that the 
willingness to pay for a second or third viewing would be considerably lower. Choosing the 
resent movies would assure that a larger number of respondents had not yet had a chance to 
see the movie they were interested in and would therefore state their reservation price.  
Even though the choice of movies was limited by the time of release, the number of possible 
title candidates was still very large. To further limit this number I’ve used movie ratings 
from the following sources: IMDb, Filmweb and Flixter. IMDb (Internet Movie Database) is 
an online database of information related to movies, television shows, actors, video games 
and visual entertainment media in general. IMDb is considered to be the world’s largest 
movie database. The website www.imdb.no provides independent movie ratings (on the 
scale from 1 to 10) by the numerous users of the database. This source is widely used to find 
information about movies as well as other users’ opinion on the respective movies. Filmweb 
is a Norwegian website dedicated to movies. It presents movies currently shown in the 
cinema, supplied with reviews, pictures and trailers. It is also possible to use this site to order 
movie tickets and give ratings to the movies on the scale from 1 to 6. Flixter is an 
international (created in USA) user-based movie site. Its purpose is mostly to allow users 
sharing movie ratings, pictures and contact other users with similar movie tastes.  
While selecting movie titles for the survey I gave the main weight to the ratings by Filmweb 
since it is a Norwegian site which presents the most urgent movies to the local market. The 
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ratings were compared to the ratings by IMDb to make sure that the chosen movies scored 
high in both databases. In the cases when Filmweb provided the same rating for more movies 
than could be included in the survey, the ones with higher IMDb ratings were chosen. For 
example, while choosing the last movie title for the category action I found two movies with 
the same Filmweb rating of 4.35. However, one of them had an IMDb rating of 7.2 while the 
other one only 6. The movie with IMDb rating of 7.2 was included into the movie list.  
Flixter ratings were used mostly to compare with the previous two sources and confirm the 
popularity of the movie in question. The list of movie titles is presented in the Table 2 
(Appendix 3). 
In the survey the movies were listed in a random order irrespectively of the release date. This 
was done to avoid possible effect of the presentation order on the expressed willingness to 
pay. That is, chronological presentation of the kind “from the oldest to the newest” or vice 
versa could have influenced perception of the movies’ value. The random order of 
presentation would help to avoid this effect. 
3.3.3 Description of the data 
The invitation to answer the questionnaire was send to 9 897 subscribers. 36 e-mail 
addresses were rejected as non-valid. The number of possible participants was thereby 
reduced to 9 861. I got 479 answers to the questionnaire, which gives 479 / 9897 * 100% = 
4.84% of the subscribers whom the invitation was sent to. I’ve received 61 e-mails from the 
subscribers who did not wish to answer the questionnaire or did not have time for that. These 
respondents were not taken out from the selection as the same could apply to more persons 
other than those who wrote the e-mails. These observations were therefore treated as refusals 
to answer. 
Table 3 (Appendix 3) displays detailed description of the selection. Here I will limit the 
description to a short summary. Most of the respondents report to be seldom movie-
consumers. Only around 11% of them go to the cinema 1-2 times a month or more often. 
Around 25% buy DVD/Blue-ray 1-2 times a month or more often and only 10% rent movies 
1-2 times a month or more frequently. Only 20% of respondents mention movie rental 
among their favourite way of movie consumption. This would explain the high number of 
zeros in the individual movie valuations. 7% report movie rental via TV-provider among 
their favourite ways of movie consumption.  
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Further, the movie preferences differ between categories. More than 55% of respondents 
chose action while family was chosen only by 15% of respondents. An interesting 
observation is that category family got the highest average valuation per movie. It could be 
explained by higher willingness to pay within the respective target group (presumably young 
parents). On the other hand, it could be an error due to the fewer observations (compare 423 
positive individual movie valuation within category family to 1824 positive individual movie 
valuations within category action).  
As for the general characteristics of the selection, I will shortly describe age, sex, income 
and age of children (if any). Over 56% of the respondents are in the age group above 45. 
79% are men, and only 21% are women.  47% of the respondents are in the middle income 
group (NOK 400 000-NOK 800 000 per year). 34% are in the income group above NOK 800 
000 per year and 19% are below NOK 400 000 per year. 81% of the respondents have 
children. 21% of them have children aged under 6, 25% have children aged 6 to 11, 23% 
have children aged 12 to 15.  
3.3.3.1 Movie valuations 
After removal of the observations with overstated willingness to pay (see section 3.3.3) the 
number of individual valuations was reduced to 5207. The valuations vary from NOK 1 to 
NOK 159, while the average value is NOK 37.34. The highest valuation on average was 
obtained by the family movie “Gråtass får en ny venn” (46.77) and the lowest was given to 
the thriller “The ghost writer” (30.81). One can see that the inter-movie differences in 
valuations are not very large.   
The valuations cluster around “round numbers” like 25, 50 and so on. The 25th percentile of 
the distribution of valuations is NOK 20. The median and 75
th
 percentile valuations are 
respectively NOK 35 and NOK 50. Table 4 (Appendix 3) shows the average movie valuation 
and median as well as selected percentile valuations. It’s easy to notice that the valuations 
over NOK 60 and the valuations over NOK 100 constitute only 10% and 5% of the data 
respectively. 
Movie valuations are positively correlated. With 15 movie titles in each category there are 
105 (=15*14/2) pairwise movie correlations. The mean correlation for the category action is 
0.77 (see Figure 5 in Appendix 2). Table 5 (Appendix 3) presents average pairwise 
correlations for all categories. As discussed in Chapter 2, product correlations indicate to 
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which extent such pricing alternative as bundling has a potential to increase revenue 
compared to uniform pricing. That is, if the products are negatively correlated, bundling 
performs better. In the case of the current study the pairwise movie correlations are positive 
and quite high
6
.  
The valuations differ both across respondents and across movies. Figure 6 (Appendix 2) 
presents distribution of cumulative valuations both on raw and parametric
7
 data. For 
instance, the figure shows that 25
th
 percentile valuation for top 5 movies is about NOK 100, 
while mean is almost NOK 200. Valuations on parametric data are lower
8
. The curves 
become flatter as the number of movies increases. It means that respondents are willing to 
pay considerably more for the movies they value most highly. The figures show substantial 
differences in valuations across individuals. A regression of individual valuations on both 
movies and individual effect gives R-squared of 1.0% (0.8%). A regression on individual 
effects yields R-squared of 0.6% (0.6%) while R-squared from the regression on movie 
effects is 0.3% (0.3%). Even though the explanatory power of the regressions is very low, it 
seems that variation in valuations is higher across individuals
9
.  
3.3.3.2 Reliability and validity of data 
A natural concern is to which extent the chosen data gathering technique produces consistent 
findings. The first question which should be addressed here is whether the data is reasonable. 
Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) express a concern about the relevance of the survey results to 
the pricing decision. They point out that one should specifically consider the survey wording 
and how it affects the response. Also, the familiarity of the evaluated object is important. It 
is typically easier to evaluate a product one is familiar with.  
The exact text of the survey questions was presented in the section 3.3.2. The respondents 
were explicitly asked to state their own valuation of the respective movie, not the market 
price or the amount they think it should cost. Each movie title was presented on a separate 
                                               
6 The correlations test was run on logs of positive individual movie valuations. 
7
 See section 4.1.2 Parametric estimation for description of fitting the data into parametric distribution. 
8 For these figures the valuations within every respondent were sorted from largest to smallest. Then the 
cumulative valuation was calculated for every respondent. Thereafter 25th, 50th and 75th percentile valuations 
were found across all the respondents for each quantity of songs. 
9 The regression was run on the log values of positive valuations. 
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web-page, accompanied with a poster picture, summary of the plot and information about the 
movie. The respondents were asked to evaluate a familiar item (a movie) they are used to 
consume daily and not something they can’t imagine the value of. Finally, I listed movie 
titles in a random order to avoid possible effects of the presentation order on the outcome 
(for instance: the order “from the newest to the oldest” or vice versa).  Furthermore, a visual 
inspection of the data indicates that the result is reasonable. The average stated willingness 
to pay fluctuates around NOK 40 which is consistent with the current market price for TV- 
and Internet-based movie rental (see Table 1 in Appendix 3). 
The next step is to check the validity of the gathered data. According to Saunders et al. 
(2009) validity shows whether the findings are really about what they appear to be about. 
One distinguishes internal validity and external validity. Internal validity refers to the extent 
to which the findings reflect the relationship between variables. External validity says 
something about how general the results are, that is, whether the findings may be applicable 
to other research settings (Saunders et al., 2009). 
It is often difficult to find a direct indicator of validity of the data, which is also the case in 
the current study. However, it is possible to find indicators which would prove it indirectly. 
One possibility would be to compare the stated movie valuations with the sales numbers for 
the respective movies. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find a reliable source of detailed 
information about revenue these movies have generated through different channels of 
distribution. Besides, the movies have different time of release, so the comparison of the 
generated revenue would reflect different time span for the movies with different date of 
release. In other words, it does not seem correct to compare the revenue generated by 
“Avatar” in 2 years with the revenue generated by “Black Swan” in several months.  
Comparing the stated movie valuation with the official movie ratings would give another 
indirect indicator of the validity of the data. The survey has shown that a considerable part of 
the respondents use movie reviews and ratings provided in the media while selecting a movie 
to watch (33.6%). That is why I have chosen correlation of the stated movie valuation with 
the rating of each movie as an indirect indicator of data’s validity. That is, if gathered data 
indeed reflects the respondents’ movie preferences, a higher willingness to pay would be 
stated for a movie rated higher.  
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The next step was to choose the source of rating information. It was mentioned earlier that 
Filmweb and IMDb were used to select the movies for the survey. But choosing only one of 
these sources for correlation test would not be right. The use of ratings by only Filmweb is 
not enough as it uses the scale of 1 to 6 so that some movies have the same ranking. Using 
the rating by only IMDb would not be entirely correct either. The reason is that it is an 
international movie database which does not necessarily reflect all the nuances of the 
Norwegian market. Thus, I summed up the scores by Filmweb and IMDb and used the 
aggregated scores to test the correlation between ratings and willingness to pay for the 
respective movies
10
. The average willingness to pay for each movie was calculated. Pearson 
correlation for the whole set of movies is 0.321 (p-value 0.005). Even though the correlation 
coefficient doesn’t seem to be especially high, one can state a statistically significant positive 
correlation between movie ratings and willingness to pay stated by the respondents. In other 
words, indeed, it seems that the respondents are willing to pay more for the movies with 
higher ratings. The detailed results of the test are presented in Table 7 (Appendix 3). 
3.4 Statistical tests 
In this section I will use the obtained data to test a number of statistical hypotheses. The data 
obtained in the survey contains information about movie consumption patterns. Naturally, 
one is interested in revealing tendencies in consumption patterns (if there is any). Statistical 
analysis of the data, in my opinion, would serve at least two purposes. Firstly, it gives an 
idea about the survey participants thus strengthening (or weakening) the reliability of the 
dataset. Secondly, it might be helpful for understanding the effect different pricing 
techniques have on the potential revenue (see Chapter 4). Besides, it would help to learn 
more about the consumer and define the target groups and pricing strategies based on the 
customer preferences. 
                                               
10
 IMDb rating was not available for two movies (“Gråtass får en ny venn” and “UMEÅ4ever”). To produce a 
score comparable with the aggregated score for the rest of the movies I first found the average IMDb score by 
summing up the scores and dividing the sum by 73 (the number of movies for which the score was available). 
Thereafter this average score was added to the Filmweb score for these two movies (“Gråtass får en ny venn” 
and “UMEÅ4ever”). Thus, for these movies the rating was determined by Filmweb only. 
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3.4.1 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H1: The frequency of movie rental is independent of gender. 
H2: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of gender. 
H3: The stated willingness to pay is independent of gender. 
H4: The choice of movie category is independent of gender. 
H5: The frequency of movie rental is independent of age. 
H6: The amount spent on the movie rental is independent of age 
H7: The stated willingness to pay is independent of age. 
H8: The choice of movie category is independent of age. 
H9: The frequency of movie rental is independent of the age of children (i.e. the age of 
children in the household has no effect on the frequency of movie rental by their parents).  
H10: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of the age of children (i.e. the age of 
children in the household has no effect on the amount spent by their parents on movie 
rental).  
H11: The stated willingness to pay is independent of the age of children (i.e. the age of 
children in the household has no effect on the willingness to pay of their parents).  
The choice of hypotheses is determined by the interest to reveal the factors which influence 
the stated willingness to pay for the movies on demand.  
3.4.2 Chi-squared test 
Chi-squared test of a contingency table was chosen for testing the hypotheses listed in the 
previous section. This test is normally used to determine that two nominal variables are 
related and to infer that the differences exist among two or more populations of nominal 
variables (Keller, 2005). The values of nominal variable are categories. 
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The contingency table contains values of two nominal variables. For example, the table used 
to test hypothesis 1 would contain values man/woman in the columns and often/seldom/never 
in the rows. The test statistics measures the similarity of the expected and observed 
frequencies: 
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where k is the number of cells in the contingency table, fi is an observed frequency, ei is an 
expected frequency. The entries in the table are observed values. The test calculates expected 
values under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. The number of degrees of 
freedom is needed to determine the rejection region. The number of degrees of freedom for a 
contingency table with r rows and c columns is υ = (r - 1) (c - 1). 
The objective of the test in this study is to compare populations of respondents. I am 
operating with nominal data i.e. the values are categories (man, woman etc). It seems 
therefore reasonable to benefit from the chi-squared test of a contingency table. MINITAB 
was used to run the tests.  
This test is designed to determine whether two nominal variables are related. However, 
while using chi-squared test one should keep in mind that the reliability of the results 
depends on the number of observations. Higher number of observations in the cells of a 
contingency table makes the results of the test more reliable. Generally, the expected values 
should be five or more to make sure that the chi-squared distribution provides an adequate 
approximation of the sampling distribution (Keller, 2005). This requirement is also called 
“rule of five”. In the next section I will describe testing of the hypotheses, paying a particular 
attention to the “rule of five”. 
3.4.3 Testing the hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses listed in the section 3.4.1 I needed to tabulate the respective 
variables. The tables are presented in Table 13 (Appendix 3). It is easy to notice that cross 
tabulated data does not always satisfy the “rule of five”. The number of observations in some 
cells is less than five. Truly, the expected values of these cells calculated by the test would 
also be less than five, undermining the reliability of test results. In such case it is reasonable 
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to combine rows or columns to increase the number of observations in the cells (Keller, 
2005). For this purpose I made the following changes: 
- Question 3: How often do you rent movies? There were five possible answer 
alternatives to this question: more often than 3-4 times in a month/ 3-4 times in a 
month/ 1-2 times in a month/ seldom/ never. Due to the low number of observations 
the first three answer alternatives were combined in one. It resulted in three 
categories: often/ seldom/ never. 
- Question 4: How much do you spend on movie rental on average per month? There 
were five possible answer alternatives: nothing/ <NOK100/ NOK100 to NOK300/ 
NOK301 to NOK500/ >NOK500. Due to the low number of observations in the three 
last answer alternatives they were combined in one. It resulted in three categories: 
nothing/ very little/ from average to much. 
- Question 13: What is your age? The age was grouped into four subgroups: 18-25, 26-
35, 36-45, over 45. Due to the low number of observations the in the first subgroup it 
was joined with the second. Thus, the number of subgroups was reduced as follows: 
18-35, 36-45, over 45. 
- Question 18: What is the age of your children? The age of children was grouped into 
four subgroups: under 6, 6-11, 12-15, over 15. Due to the low number of 
observations the first two subgroups were joined into one. The same was done to the 
last two subgroups. It resulted in two age categories: small children/ older children.  
- Hypothesis 3, 7 and 11 required data on individual valuations. The individual 
valuations (stated willingness to pay) are interval data, which are real numbers. To 
make it suitable for using in a chi-squared test of a contingency table, the data had to 
be turned into nominal data (the values of nominal data are categories). For this 
purpose the individual valuations were divided into five categories: NOK 0/ NOK 1 -
NOK 10/ NOK 11 - NOK 25/ NOK 26 - NOK 35/ over NOK 35. The observations 
were replaced with the number of the corresponding category, and this (nominal) 
data was used in the test. 
Both original and transformed data is presented in Table 13 (Appendix 3). 
The results of the tests are presented in the table below.  
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Hypothesis 
Pearson 
chi-square df P-value 
1. The frequency of movie rental is independent of gender 0.118 2 0.943 
2. The amount spent on movie rental is independent of gender 7.599 2 0.022* 
3. The stated willingness to pay is independent of gender  4.308 4 0.366  
4. The choice of movie category is independent of gender 41.042 4 0.000* 
5. The frequency of movie rental is independent of age 18.652 4 0.001* 
6. The amount spent on movie rental is independent of age 25.748 4 0.000* 
7. The stated willingness to pay is independent of age  40.774 8 0.000*  
8. The choice of movie category is independent of age 24.491 8 0.002* 
9. The frequency of movie rental is independent of the age of children 6.380 2 0.041* 
10. The amount spent on movie rental is independent of the age of children 5.538 2 0.063 
11. The stated willingness to pay is independent of the age of children  17.936 4 0.001*  
    
*statistically significant at 5% significance level    
 
Some of the test results are quite expected and confirm intuitive assumptions. Others, 
however, seem rather surprising.  
The results show that there is strong evidence to infer that the frequency of movie rental and 
age are related. The same goes for the amount spent on movie rental and age. These 
conclusions are expected and seem reasonable, as younger people are believed to be more 
interested in movie rental than the older ones.  
The results also show that there is strong evidence to infer that the choice of movie category 
is related to age and gender. This result is perhaps not quite as intuitive as the previous one. 
On the other hand, it might seem normal that men tend to choose action and thriller while 
women are more inclined to choose drama and comedy. This relationship, however, could be 
studied closer. Another interesting result is that the amount spent on movie rental and gender 
is related. It other words the men seem to spend more money on movie rental then women. 
But on the other hand, the test does not provide enough evidence to reject the hypothesis 1 
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(the frequency of movie rental is independent of gender). In other words one cannot state 
that men also rent movies more often than women. 
The thought behind hypotheses 9-11 was to test whether consumption pattern of the parents 
of small children differs from the rest of the respondents. The conclusions are rather 
indecisive. The test results show that there is statistically significant evidence to infer that 
the frequency of movie rental and the age of children are related. It is, however, not possible 
to say that the amount spent on movie rental and the age of children is related. There is 
namely not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis 10 (the amount spent on movie rental is 
independent of the age of children). However, parents of small children express clearly 
higher willingness to pay for movie rental via television. There is statistically significant 
evidence to infer that stated willingness to pay of respondents with small children is higher 
compared to the respondents with older children, aged between 12 and 15 (hypothesis 11).  
3.5 Conclusive remarks 
In this chapter I have described the research methodology of the current study and presented 
the results of data gathering. Firstly, the research design was described. Thereafter the 
information gathering technique was presented in detail, including target group and design of 
the questionnaire. After that the survey results were presented and discussed. The discussion 
of the results was supplemented with statistical tests of a number of hypotheses concerning 
consumption patterns of different groups of customers.  
In the next chapter I will move to the analysis on the obtained observations of willingness to 
pay (individual movie valuations) for TV-based movie rental. 
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4. Analysis 
In this part I will conduct an analysis on the individual movie valuations obtained in the 
survey. The analysis consists of two parts. Firstly, I will describe the distribution of the data 
and explain the advantages of replacing raw data with parametric estimates. I will then 
simulate a dataset based on the key parameters of the raw data (mean, standard deviation, 
correlation and covariance). In the second part of analysis I will apply different pricing 
techniques such as uniform pricing, component pricing, product bundling and two-part tariff 
to the simulated dataset to compare the effect these techniques have on the breakdown of the 
area under demand curve (produces surplus, consumer surplus, and dead weight loss). 
4.1 Preparing data for analysis 
The analysis to be conducted aims at defining the pricing alternative which performs best 
with respect to the capturing of the available surplus. I will then need to determine the 
revenue-maximizing solutions for each of the alternatives. This approach is based on the 
assumption that the underlying utility functions are smooth. It means that to obtain credible 
results a smooth distribution of the values is important. The character of the valuation 
distribution of raw data presents a challenge in this respect. I decided therefore to use 
parametric estimates in the analysis. 
In the next section I will describe the distribution of the observed valuations. Thereafter the 
process of parametric estimation will be presented. 
4.1.1 Distribution of individual valuations 
Fig. 1 (Appendix 2) presents the distribution of the observed valuations. It’s easy to see that 
the number of observations is especially high at the “round” numbers, such as 25, 30, 40, 
being extremely high at 50. Most probably, it results from the respondents’ tendency to 
round the valuations to the nearest 5 or to the nearest 5 minus 1. This fact presents a 
challenge with respect to analysis of the data. The tendency to round valuations up or down 
leads to overstated quantity of movies valued at, say, NOK 50, while the quantity of movies 
valued at NOK 46, NOK 47, NOK 48 and NOK 51, NOK 52, NOK 53 is understated. 
Respondents tend to report a valuation of NOK 50 if they value a movie NOK 51. They are 
also most likely to report a valuation of NOK 49 if they value a movie NOK 48 or NOK 47.  
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Fig. 2 (Appendix 2) presents overall demand curve constructed by ordering individual 
valuation observations from highest to lowest. Fig. 3 (Appendix 1) shows the single-price 
revenue function derived from the observed data. For this function, the individual valuation 
observations were ordered from highest to lowest, defining V(n)
11
. Then, the maximum 
revenue available from selling any quantity n is n*V(n). One can easily see that the 
“bunching” of the valuations results in plateaus on the demand function and spikes on the 
revenue function. The use of raw data in the analysis will, therefore, give misleading results. 
It will overstate the revenue available at multiples of 5 and the values slightly below these 
(such prices as NOK 39, NOK 49 etc.). At the same time it will understate the revenue 
available at the prices slightly higher than multiples of 5.  
Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) underline that if spikes are sufficiently large, the estimated 
maximum revenue available will be exaggerated compared to the true maximum revenue. 
Further, they argue that use of the raw data for comparison of the impact different pricing 
techniques have on the breakdown of the area under demand curve would give misleading 
conclusions. This is due to the understatement of the benefit of pricing techniques that 
involve valuation of bundles. Indeed, summing up of valuations for different movies might 
average out the rounding error, thus removing the spikes. In such a case the maximum 
revenue available from a bundle would not be overstated.  
In this study I will use uniform pricing model as a benchmark for other pricing schemes, 
including bundling. While applying uniform pricing one treats each observation separately, 
without considering other valuations by the same respondent. As mentioned before, if I use 
the observed (raw) data, the maximum revenue available under this pricing technique will 
most probably be overstated compared to the true value. Indeed, an analysis conducted on 
the raw data resulted in a revenue-maximizing uniform price of NOK 30 (see Table 11, 
Appendix 3). The analysis on the parametric data, however, gave a revenue-maximizing 
uniform price of NOK 25. As for bundling pricing, the maximum revenue available will 
most probably be close to the true revenue. Indeed, if we look at the share of producer 
surplus obtainable with pure bundling, the results of the analyses conducted on raw (0.445) 
and parametric (0.437) data are almost identical (see Table 9-10, Appendix 3). At the same 
time, the share of producer surplus obtainable with uniform pricing is considerably higher if 
                                               
11 Here I adopt the symbols used by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). 
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I conduct the analysis on the raw data (0.505) rather than parametric data (0.434). It seems 
therefore wrong to compare results of applying these models directly on the raw data. Shiller 
and Waldfogel have chosen to use parametric estimates in their study. Their approach seems 
to be reasonable also for the current study. 
4.1.2 Parametric estimation  
In order to get smoother demand curve and revenue function I’ve chosen to fit the valuation 
data to a parametric distribution. The next step is to choose the type of distribution and to 
determine the parameters. 
Visual inspection of the distribution of raw data (individual valuations) does not give a clear 
answer about the distribution which would describe the values. Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) 
argue that lognormal distribution explains their data better than normal distribution. 
Lognormal distribution denotes a continuous probability distribution of a random variable 
whose logarithm is normally distributed. Also in the current study positive valuations have a 
pattern similar to lognormal distribution. However, an extremely high number of valuations 
at NOK 50 presents a remarkable irregularity. As mentioned above, it can be explained by 
the tendency to round valuations. To reduce the effect of this tendency I have grouped 
observed positive valuations into 10 groups thus reducing the number of bins and joining 
valuations which lie close to each other. Fig. 4 (Appendix 2) presents the fit of the grouped 
data to a lognormal distribution. The effects of “rounding” can still be observed, but one can 
see that a lognormal distribution is a reasonable choice to describe the observed data. 
Because of the reasons discussed above I have chosen a lognormal distribution. However, 
there are two relationships independent form each other: the probability of getting a positive 
valuation and the absolute value of the positive valuation. Indeed, the probability of getting a 
positive valuation depends on the choice of movies and the personal preferences of the 
respondents. The absolute value of a valuation, however, depends on the reservation price of 
a respondent. For instance, two respondents with the same preferences for horror movies 
assign valuations to the same movies. They both hate the same three movies of the suggested 
selection. So, they state their valuation for those three movies at zero. These respondents, 
however, have different reservation prices. The first one would pay NOK 15 at most, 
because he could easily download an illegal copy for free. The other respondent, unlike the 
first one, values the movies at NOK 70, because he appreciates quality and the alternative for 
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him would be to see the movie in the cinema. This example was given to illustrate that the 
probability of getting a positive valuation appears to be driven by parameters other than 
those which generate positive valuations. Therefore I needed to estimate the parameters 
separately for (1) generating positive valuations and for (2) getting positive valuations (i.e. 
positive valuations as opposed to zero), so-called “zero-inflated multivariate lognormal”12 
distribution. 
First, as explained before, I assume that the positive valuations have a lognormal 
distribution. I modelled the log positive valuations vij = μj + εij
13
, where μ is mean and ε is 
normally distributed. Here i denotes individual and j denotes movie. I estimated μ and the 
standard deviation of ε, σj, using only positive valuations for movie j by respondent i. I then 
estimate the correlation of valuations between movie j and k (ρjk) using logs of valuations for 
individuals who report positive valuations for both movies j and k. 
Thereafter I estimated the probabilities that respondent report positive valuations using the 
model yij = θj + ϵij where y is binary: it equals 1 if the valuation is positive and 0 if the 
observed valuation is 0. I estimated each θj by running movie-specific probit regression. To 
estimate the correlation of ϵ across the movies, I estimated a bivariate probit regression for 
each pair of songs. 
I used the parameters obtained above to simulate valuations for 5 000 individuals. The 
quantity was determined by the following reasoning. To conduct the analysis, the number 
should be high enough to satisfy the requirements to the size of a random sample. Visual 
examination of the simulated data, its valuation distribution, demand function and revenue 
functions looked considerably smoother then the corresponding graphs based on the raw data 
(see Figures 7-9, Appendix 2). Further, visual examination of the respective graphs based on 
the simulated data containing 10 000 observation showed that the further increase of the 
number of observations does not influence the smoothness of the figures. That is, since the 
aim of fitting the data into a parametric distribution was to remove spikes from the curves 
and by so doing make the data smoother, 5000 observations seems to be a large enough 
sample. Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) also argue that 5000 is a large enough sample. The 
                                               
12 This definition is adopted from the study by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). 
13 Here I apply the symbols used by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). 
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simulation was performed in STATA. Appendix 5 displays list of the commands used in the 
process of simulation. 
4.1.3 Movie categories and parametric estimation  
One thing should be mentioned before I move to the analysis on the simulated data. That is, 
the role of dividing the movie list into categories and how I dealt with it in the process of 
simulation.  
As described in the section 3.3, the movie titles in the survey were divided into five 
categories. The challenge would be to use all this information in determining the parameters 
for fitting the data into a parametric distribution. This would present the following 
difficulties. Firstly, I would have to determine correlations between movie valuations within 
different categories. It would be technically difficult, provided that only few individual have 
chosen several categories. Secondly, using valuation information about all the categories 
would increase number of parameters and make the parameterization process very complex. 
So I went for a simpler approach. I used the information collected in the survey to choose the 
category to be used in parametric estimation. For a category to be chosen for further analysis 
I set the following requirements. Firstly, it must be the most representative category, that is 
the category that has the highest number of observations. Secondly, the data must have the 
highest validity indication of all five categories.  
The category action got the highest number of observations (3990
14
). As an indication of 
validity I used the correlation between observed average valuation (stated willingness to pay) 
for each movie and rating of the respective move provided by Filmweb and IMDb (see 
section 3.3.3). So I had to compare the number of observations within each category and 
correlation between movie valuations and movie ratings. The highest positive correlation 
(0,86, p-value 0,000) was observed in the category drama. Action had the next best result 
(0,64, p-value 0,010) which is still better than the correlation over the whole set of movies 
(0,32, p-value 0,005). The category action was chosen for further analysis because of the 
highest number of observations and a high validity indication. Table 6 (Appendix 3) shows 
the number of observations by categories. Table 7 (Appendix 3) displays the results of 
correlation test between individual movie valuations and movie ratings by categories. It can 
                                               
14 This number includes both positive and zero valuations. 
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be noticed that categories family and thriller both display negative correlation. Such a result 
does not seem reasonable and might be due to a relatively low number of observations in 
these categories. Even if summed up these two categories give a lower number of 
observations than action category alone. Thus, using action for parameterization and further 
analysis (i.e. limiting the dataset to action only) can also give an additional advantage: 
dropping off the categories which most probably reduce the validity of the dataset. 
For the reasons explained above the observations used for parameterization were limited to 
the category action. The parameters were used to simulate valuations of 5 000 individuals. 
The resulting valuation distribution, demand and single-price revenue functions are 
displayed in the Fig. 7-9 (Appendix 2). 
4.2  Application of pricing techniques 
In this part I will present the results of applying different pricing techniques on the simulated 
observations. The following alternatives were used: uniform pricing, product bundling and 
two-part tariff. The main focus in the analysis is on the breakdown of the available surplus. I 
will calculate and present the share of producer surplus, consumer surplus and dead weight 
loss under these pricing alternatives. Uniform pricing will be using as a benchmark. 
Producer surplus is normally defined as the amount of producer benefit by selling all units 
produced at market price that is higher than the marginal cost of production (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2009). Consumer surplus represents the benefit resulting from the difference 
between what the highest price a consumer is willing to pay and what the consumer actually 
pays. Deadweight loss is defined as net loss of total surplus, which occurs in the situations 
when, for example, people who have more marginal benefits than marginal cost are not 
buying the products. I assume that the marginal cost of the movies on demand is zero so that 
the surplus in this case is the entire area under the demand curve. The reasoning for this 
assumption is as follows. Firstly, the cost for selling an extra copy of a movie is indeed close 
to zero. Secondly, the focus of this study is to compare the breakdown of the surplus using 
different pricing techniques. The cost of selling an extra movie is the same for all the pricing 
alternatives and thus would have no impact on the change in the share of producer surplus, 
consumer surplus and dead weight loss. 
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4.2 Uniform pricing 
To calculate the profit maximizing uniform price for a movie the following was done. 
Firstly, all the (n) movie valuations were ordered from highest to lowest: V1…Vn
15
. 
Thereafter, I calculated the revenue as n*Vn when Vn per movie is charged. For example, if 
Vn=40 and Vn+1=39, exactly n movies can be sold at the price 40, since the reservation price 
for the next individual/movie will be lower than that. Fig. 9 (Appendix 2) displays the 
single-price (uniform price) revenue function relating revenue to the number of movies sold. 
The revenue maximizing price for uniform pricing is NOK 25. In this case the producer 
captures 43% of the surplus, while customer surplus and dead weight loss constitute 38% 
and 19% respectively (Table 9, Appendix 3).  
Customer surplus was calculated as the difference between the individual valuation of the 
movie and the revenue maximizing single price (NOK 25) for each of the individual 
valuations higher than NOK 25. The individual surpluses were then summed up to find the 
total consumer surplus for this pricing technique. Dead weight loss was found by subtracting 
revenue (producer surplus) and customer surplus from the total available surplus. The total 
surplus, as noted before, is the total area under demand curve and was found simply by 
summing up all individual valuations. 
It should, however, be pointed out that in this section all the movies were treated as a single 
good without differentiating the release time. In my case it would be impossible to take into 
consideration the release time since the observations were simulated. In reality, the use of 
uniform pricing would be a wrong approach for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
willingness to pay for the newer movies is typically higher.  Using of uniform pricing is 
wrong in this case as it impedes producer from capturing consumer surplus while selling 
newer movies. At the same time one loses the customers whose reservation price for an older 
movie is lower than the single revenue maximizing price.  Secondly, one should also take 
into consideration the genre of a movie. Movies are normally a matter of taste. It would be 
wrong to assume the same demand and willingness to pay for all movies. Thus, the use of 
uniform pricing would impede producer from capturing additional consumer surplus from 
the movies which hit the personal preferences.  
                                               
15 Here I apply the symbols used by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). 
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The results described above are obtained from the simulated dataset based on the valuations 
for action category. However, after performing the same calculations
16
 for other categories I 
found that the breakdown of the surplus is quite similar. Table 10 (Appendix 3) displays the 
breakdown of the surplus (while applying uniform pricing) for all movie categories. 
Like Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) I’m going to use the results obtained in this section as a 
benchmark for evaluating other pricing alternatives. 
4.3 Component pricing 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 component pricing implies setting a different price to each 
movie. Being rather difficult to implement in practice, this alternative is however interesting 
to explore.  
To find the revenue maximizing prices for each song I used the same approach as in the 
previous section. The individual movie valuations were ordered from highest to lowest 
within each of the movies. Thereafter I found the revenue for each movie. The resulting 
revenue-maximizing prices for each of the 15 movies in the action category are presented in 
the Table 12 (Appendix 3).  
The results of this pricing alternative are quite disappointing, taking into consideration that it 
is a more sophisticated alternative than uniform pricing. Producer and consumer surplus 
remain almost unchanged (producer surplus increases by 0.7% while consumer surplus 
increases by 0.1%). Dead weight loss goes down by 2%.  
4.4 Pure bundling 
Using pure bundling implies calculating the revenue-maximizing price for the whole set of 
suggested movies. 
The total of 15 movies was considered a bundle. The calculations were performed in the 
following way. Firstly, I found an individual category valuation for every respondent. For 
                                               
16 The dataset based on valuations by 5000 simulated respondents was created for all of the categories. The 
profit maximizing uniform price and the surplus breakdown was calculated for each of the categories.  
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this, I summed up individual movie valuations within a respondent. Thereafter the revenue 
maximizing bundle price was calculated in the same way as used in the previous sections. In 
other words, I ordered all the 15-movie bundle valuations from highest to lowest and 
calculated the corresponding revenues. The obtained revenue maximizing price for 15 
movies is NOK 167. The impact on the breakdown of surplus is rather insignificant. 
Compared to the uniform pricing, revenue raises by 0.6%, consumer surplus raises by 1.5% 
while dead weight loss goes down by 4.5%. 
Then, the different bundle sizes were considered, namely 3 movies and 5 movies. For this, I 
tested 10 random bundling combinations. The alternatives were tested under the assumption 
that the movies could be sold only within a bundle (i.e. it would be impossible to purchase a 
single movie). Also, a movie could be included into one bundle only. That is, if movie 1 was 
available as a part of the bundle together with the movies 2 and 3, it could not be available as 
a part of another bundle or combined with other movies. Table 9 (Appendix 3) displays the 
results. It should be pointed out that even the best alternative out of 10 (both for bundling by 
3 and 5 movies) performed significantly worse than uniform pricing.  
Even though the bundles of 5 performed slightly better than the bundles of 3, both of these 
alternatives perform considerably worse than uniform pricing. Thus, the producer surplus 
goes down by 7.3% for bundles of 3. Bundles of 5 reduce the producer surplus by 5.8%. 
Under bundling by 3 the consumer surplus drops by 0.6%, while bundling by 5 movies raises 
consumer surplus by 2.1%. The dead weight loss is raised in the both cases. Under bundles 
of 3 the dead weight loss raises by 18%. The corresponding number for bundles of 5 is 9.2%. 
4.5 Two-part tariff 
Application of two-part tariff implies introduction of per-movie price p in combination with 
a hookup fee T which is independent of the number of movies purchased. Shiller and 
Waldfogel (2009) point out that uniform pricing and pure bundling are both the extreme 
versions of two-part tariff. In the first case the hookup fee T is equal to zero while in the 
second the movie price p is equal to zero. In this section the focus is on finding the revenue 
maximizing combination of T and p.  
To solve this problem I used Excel Solver (evolutionary solving method for non-smooth 
problems). The following variables were defined: 
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Ti: hookup fee 
pi: per-movie price 
V: individual movie valuation.  Vmr: individual valuation by respondent r of the movie m; Vr 
sum of individual valuations by respondent r, i.e. the valuation of the entire set of movies by 
this respondent. 
R: revenue. Rmr: revenue from movie m sold to respondent r. Rr: revenue from selling movies 
to the respondent r (all the movies this respondent is willing to buy without taking into 
consideration the hookup fee); Rt: the total revenue from a respondent including revenue 
from all the movies a respondent is willing to buy for the price pi combined with the hookup 
fee Ti. 
CS: customer surplus. CSr: customer surplus for respondent r resulting from selling all the 
movies this respondent is willing to buy for the price pi without taking into consideration the 
hookup fee. Consumer surplus was calculated as the difference between the sum of the 
individual movie valuations by respondent r and the sum total revenue from the movies sold 
to this respondent: CSr = Vr -  Rr  
The problem was formulated as follows: to maximize the total revenue by trying different 
combinations of the hookup fee Ti and per-movie price pi. The following conditions were 
formulated:  
1) If per-movie price pi exceeds the individual movie valuation of a respondent r, the 
resulting revenue from the movie m (Rmr) would be zero (no purchase). 
2) If per-movie price pi is less or equal to the individual movie valuation of a respondent 
r, but the entrance fee Ti exceeds the remaining consumer surplus CSr of this 
respondent, the resulting revenue from this respondent would be zero (no purchase).  
3) Non-negativity for all the values.  
 
The Solver-model was built as follows. Firstly, the cells for changing values of Ti and pi 
were chosen. To make sure that pi was less or equal to the individual movie valuation I set a 
control column for each “respondent”. For each individual movie valuation, the values in 
that column were set to pi (if the respective movie valuation was higher or equal to pi) or 
zero (if the respective movie valuation was lower than pi). The sum of the values of the 
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control column showed the revenue obtainable from a “respondent” by selling movies given 
the price pi  (that is, Rr). There was, however, a hookup fee Ti to be taken into consideration. 
For this purpose, I calculated consumer surplus for each “respondent” by subtracting Rr from 
the sum of individual valuations by this respondent Vr (CSr = Vr -  Rr). If consumer surplus 
CSr was higher or equal to the hookup fee Ti, it was assumed that a “respondent” would 
make a purchase. In the opposite case, the purchase wouldn’t take place at all, since the 
movies would not be available without a hookup fee. So, if consumer surplus CSr was higher 
or equal to the hookup fee Ti, the hookup fee was added to Rr resulting in the total revenue 
obtainable from the respondent Rt. In the opposite case, Rt was set to zero. Solver model was 
used to find the values of Ti and pi maximizing ∑Rt. A macro was used to perform the 
repetitive task of setting formulas into the model.  
The resulting combination of (T; p) is (NOK 73.3; NOK 25.5). The use of two-part tariff 
improves revenue considerably compared to uniform pricing – the revenue increases by 
almost 37%. It seems to happen partly on the expense of consumers: consumer surplus drops 
by 30%, while dead weight loss goes down by 23%. The results are displayed in Table 9 
(Appendix 3).  
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5. Discussion 
This section will sum up the findings of the previous chapter. The evaluation of the results is 
based on the theory presented in Chapter 2. Some of the findings will be compared to the 
corresponding results from the study by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). Thereafter, the 
research method will be discussed; its weaknesses and possible pitfalls will be pointed out. 
5.1 Summary of results 
The economic theory indicates that various forms of price discrimination should provide 
significantly better results compared to uniform pricing with respect to the breakdown of the 
area under demand curve. The work by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) is among the works 
which prove this statement right. The current study is not an exception. This empirical study 
with movies on demand in its focus has shown that price discrimination is able to increase 
producer surplus compared to the results obtained while using uniform pricing. There are, 
however, two peculiarities about the results of the current study. Firstly, the producer surplus 
available by using uniform pricing is already quite significant (43.5% compared to 27% in 
the case of digital music). Secondly, component pricing and bundling perform surprisingly 
poorly compared to uniform pricing. Thus, component pricing increases producer surplus by 
only 0.7% and pure bundling by 0.6%.  
Two-part tariff performs decisively better than any of the pricing alternatives described 
above. It should also be mentioned that the share of the producer surplus reaches 59.4% 
under this pricing alternative. In general, the results of the current study differ from the 
results obtained by Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). Of course, the subjects of studies are rather 
different: Shiller and Waldfogel focused on digital music while I am interested in movies 
available for rental via TV. However, the difference in results is quite striking. Firstly, it is 
the absolute value of the revenue’s share of surplus. Shiller and Waldfogel came to the 
conclusion that none of the pricing alternatives raises revenue’s share of surplus above 37%. 
In general, the revenue’s share of surplus in their study varies from 27% (uniform pricing) to 
36.9% (two-part tariff).  In the current study the producer surplus is significantly higher: 
from 43.5% (uniform pricing) to 59.4% (two-part tariff). Secondly, the pricing alternatives 
perform differently in case of movies on demand compared to digital music. Shiller and 
Waldfogel found that two-part tariff performs very similar to pure bundling. Based on the 
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results of my study, I cannot say the same. In my study two-part tariff is the decisive winner, 
while pure bundling achieves almost the same result as component pricing. It should be 
mentioned that the last two perform only slightly better than uniform pricing.  
Surprisingly, bundling by 3 and 5 movies performs worse than uniform pricing. It does not 
seem consistent with economic theory. However, the characteristics of the data might 
provide an explanation to this result. As pointed out in the section 3.3.3, pairwise movie 
correlations are positive and quite high. The mean correlation for category action is 0.77. 
Economic theory shows that for bundling to perform better than alternative pricing 
techniques negative correlation of the products is a desirable condition. Then bundling can 
able capture more of the revenue compared,  to uniform pricing. Positive correlation of 0.77 
indicates that bundling most probably will not perform well on this data.  
As discussed in section 3.3.3 the variance in the valuation data arise both across individuals 
and across movies. That is, movies differ with respect to the value they have for a 
respondent. Respondents are also quite different with respect to their preferences. One can, 
in other words, distinguish heterogeneity both across movies and across individuals. Hitt and 
Chen (2003) studied bundling in the situations with heterogeneous demand. They argue that 
limiting the size of a bundle leads to a substantial dead weight loss when the customers have 
heterogeneous preferences. Indeed, while bundling by 5 movies raises dead weight loss by 
9%, reducing bundle size to 3 movies raises dead weight loss by 18%, that is, double as 
much (see Table 9, Appendix 3).  
One should mention that the success of two-part tariff might also be explained by the 
heterogeneous demand. Thus, defining the hookup fee T alongside with per-movie price p 
enables the price discrimination of consumers in a more effective way. Hookup fee T and 
per-movie price p are both instruments used to differentiate the customers. That is, the 
hookup fee T helps to distinguish customers by the level of general expenditure on the 
respective goods. Per-movie price p helps to distinguish customers by their reservation 
prices for single movies while the possibility to pick a movie captures the individual movie 
preferences. Furthermore, as several studies indicate (Hitt and Chen 2003, Fishburn, 
Odlyzhko and Siders 2000), pricing techniques which allow self-selection often perform 
better compared to bundling with pre-defined set of goods. Two-part tariff has a self-
selection element in the sense that consumers can choose freely from the vast library of titles 
instead of being offered a pre-defined set of movie titles.  
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So what is the optimal pricing technique for movies on demand? The results of this study 
indicate that perhaps not component pricing and not bundling. As for the bundling, one 
should specify that in this study I considered only small sizes of bundles, such as 15, 5 and 3 
movies. One could think of the bundles consisting of 100 movies or more. But in the context 
of this study such a bundle should rather be considered a special version of two-part tariff 
with p=0. And two-part tariff is an alternative which has a potential to increase producer 
surplus considerably. But pricing decision should not be limited to calculations of expected 
revenue only. Very important elements of the pricing decision are analysis of the customer 
groups as well as analyses of market and product. Movie on demand as a product shares 
some of the features with information goods (that is, digital goods provided via Internet), as 
well as pricing challenges. 
The question of pricing of information goods has been discussed in the literature and 
mentioned above in this study (see Chapter 2). There are opinions that in a fast-growing 
market the simple flat rate is the optimal choice (A. Odlyzko, 2001). Also Chu, Leslie, 
Sorensen (2009) claim that simple pricing strategies are often nearly optimal. Fishburn 
(2000), on the other hand, expresses a strong belief that while uniform pricing is used by 
newcomers to the market, bundling is the way to choose for the established firms. But an 
important aspect to consider would be the nature of the product. The opinions listed above 
consider information goods, provided mostly via Internet. The focus of the current study is, 
however, TV-based movies on demand. While this product shares some of the features with 
information goods (such as marginal cost), other features are quite different (such as 
demands to quality, ways of consumption). So the next question is whether movies on 
demand can be treated as information good. To my opinion the answer is yes, but with some 
restrictions. One should not forget that a movie is a particular good. First, the cost of 
providing movies via TV is considerably larger than the cost of offering information goods 
via internet. The production cost of a movie is borne by the production studios which then 
charge high fees for the rights to distribute a movie. Information goods distributed via 
Internet, however, are often distributed by the producers (software, music, photos, and 
research reports). Second, there is a limit of how many movies one can watch within a 
particular period of time. Consumption of movies is more time- and attention consuming 
than, for instance, digital music. Finally, it is to a large degree a matter of personal taste. 
That is why one should also take into account the customer characteristics. Here it would be 
reasonable to sum up the results of statistical tests conducted as a part of this study. The 
 55 
results have shown that movie consumption patterns differ with gender, age and the age of 
children in the family (if any). It means that the optimal price discrimination should not only 
focus on quantity of movies consumed, but also distinguish target groups by gender, age, 
small children in the family and so on.  
Thus, in my opinion, the optimal pricing technique for movies on demand would be a 
version of two-part tariff or, possibly, a set of two-part tariffs targeting specific groups of 
customers. A more complex pricing scheme, such as dynamic pricing or third-degree price 
discrimination would have at least two disadvantages. Firstly, it would be more costly to 
implement. Secondly, it would frustrate the customers who would have difficulties 
understanding it. Even though Odlyzko (2001) argued for uniform pricing, this technique 
would most probably perform worse than uniform pricing, even though this alternative 
would be the easiest to implement and the most understandable one for the customers. 
Finally, while arguing for the simple linear price (i.e. uniform pricing), Odlyzko (2001) had 
a rapidly growing market in mind. Video on demand doesn’t seem to correspond to this 
definition. Even though the service has been in the market for at least ten years, it hasn’t 
been spreading fast, as pointed out in Chapter 1. 
In the next section I will discuss weakness and pitfalls of the research method used in the 
current study. 
5.2 Evaluation of research method 
This study is based on the data collected in an online survey. This method is known to be a 
quick, inexpensive and efficient way to assess information about the population (Saunders 
2009, Zikmund 1997). However, one should keep in mind its pitfalls. I would like to draw 
particular attention to two aspects. First one is the weaknesses of the online survey as a 
method. Second one is the pitfalls of this method when used to elicit customers’ willingness 
to pay.  
One of the main weaknesses of survey as a research method is dependence on the survey 
questions. One does not communicate with the respondents directly and has a rather limited 
opportunity to get information other than outlined by the questions in the questionnaire. 
This, however, seems a minor problem in the current study. In this study I was interested in 
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movie consumption statistics and individual movie valuations. For these purposes 
standardized questions seem to be an acceptable method of information gathering.  
Among other challenges of the survey method there are self-selection bias and response bias. 
Self-selection bias denotes the situation in which some of the respondents are most likely to 
respond to the questionnaire than the others. For instance, respondents who are interested in 
the product and/or like it are more likely to answer the survey questions than those who are 
not familiar with the product. This is a problem for the surveys where one needs to assess 
information across the whole population, for example to elicit the opinion about a service or 
a product. If only those who have a particular interest in the product choose to participate in 
the survey, the results might be skewed. However, it seems to be a minor problem for the 
current study. The main purpose of the survey was to elicit willingness to pay for movies on 
demand. Respondents with special interest for movies and their valuations were of a 
particular interest, as there is a higher probability that they are potential consumers of on 
demand services. Thus, self-selection in this case could be perceived more as an advantage 
then as a disadvantage.  
The next challenge, response bias, occurs when respondents misrepresent the truth, either 
consciously or unconsciously. It happens when respondents, for instance, want to create a 
favourable impression. Alternatively it could happen if a respondent misunderstands the 
question. In either case the reliability of the results is undermined. In this study I tried to 
make the questions short, precise and clear. Besides, I included several questions for 
validation of the answers. Thus, the respondents were asked about their average monthly 
movie consumption, both frequency and amount of money they spend. The stated movie 
valuations for a respondent were compared with the answers to these validation questions in 
order to assess the reliability of the answers. In case of discrepancies between movie 
valuations and the answers to the questions about average movie consumption, the valuation 
data was deemed misleading and was removed from the dataset. 
Further, there is criticism connected to using open ended survey as a research method for 
eliciting customers’ willingness to pay. Nysveen and Pedersen (2004) point out that surveys 
tend to overestimate willingness to pay. This is related to the discrepancy between perceived 
attitude and the real intention to buy. That is, the respondent states the valuation of the 
product, but it does not always mean that at the moment of decision making he/she will 
really purchase the product. On the other hand, Nysveen and Pedersen mention the factors 
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that may lead to the underestimation of willingness to pay. One of them is sub-additivity. In 
the case of sub-additivity, respondents tend to add the cost of all items listed (movie titles in 
the case of the current study) which leads to conservative evaluations. Another possible 
pitfall is the possibility that a respondent feels “out of money” as he/she gets to the items 
(movie titles) further down on the list and gives more conservative estimates than in the 
beginning of the list (Nysveen, Pedersen 2004).  
In this study I have tried to avoid the situation when movie valuations would be misleading. 
Firstly, I ensured that the customers understand the purchase situation. This was done by 
presenting a concise text explaining the situation (se Chapter 3). To make respondents 
familiar with the product, I included a poster picture and a short description of the movie. 
Thereafter, the stated individual movie valuations were examined carefully and compared to 
the stated movie consumption patterns. All the outliers and doubtful valuations (those which 
would not match the stated movie consumption pattern) were removed from the dataset.  
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Main findings 
In this empirical study I’ve used the data on willingness to pay obtained from an online 
survey to calculate the impact of selected pricing techniques on the breakdown of the area 
under demand curve. Moreover, the data was used to statistically test hypotheses about 
consumer patterns for the movie rental.  
The main findings of the study are as follows: 
Firstly, the study has shown that a considerable share of the surplus (43%) can be 
appropriated by the producer by using uniform pricing technique (compare to 27% in the 
study of digital music by Shiller and Waldfogel). Secondly, more sophisticated alternatives 
have proved surprisingly little effective compared to uniform pricing. Component pricing 
and pure bundling improve the result of uniform pricing only by 0.7% and 0.6% 
respectively. Out of the tested pricing alternatives only two-part tariff has performed 
significantly better than uniform pricing. It raised revenue by 37% from 43% to 59% of the 
total surplus. But even though some of the surplus is still out of the reach of the producer, 
the results could indicate that sophisticated pricing has a potential to have a large impact on 
the revenue. The results of this study point towards two-part tariff as a possible way to go for 
the distributers of movies on demand. 
Statistical tests performed on the survey data in section 3.4.3 revealed several tendencies in 
the consumption patterns. Thus, there is statistical evidence to infer that consumption habits 
differ between genders and age groups. In addition, families with young children also prove 
having different consumption habits compared to other respondent groups. This knowledge 
could be helpful for creating and offering several two-part tariffs, specifically designed for 
separate target groups.  
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6.2 Limitations 
In this section I will point out a number of moments which should be taken into 
consideration while evaluating the results of this study.  
Firstly, as most of the empirical studies, this one is dependent on the quality of data. The 
results are subject to sampling error. I am also aware of the fact that the analysis is based on 
rather limited number of respondents (479). Besides, the respondents were chosen from the 
customers of one particular company and might not be fully representative for the whole 
population.  
Secondly, one should keep in mind the challenges of the movie selection process in this 
study. The number of movies chosen for the survey was limited to 75. Even though an 
attempt was made to capture diverse movie preferences by including titles from different 
categories as well as release time spread over 3 years, there is still a possibility that not all 
the respondents found a movie appealing to them.  
Thirdly, this study covers a product which is relatively unknown to the customers. Of course, 
movie rental as such is a widely known phenomenon. However, the survey has shown that 
not many respondents have tried on demand services. It means that the experience of renting 
movies via TV provider is an unknown consumption experience for many of them. 
Furthermore, one should keep in mind that on demand services are not limited to movie 
library only. On-demand concept includes also TV-shows, news, sport and other content. 
The movie library is just a part of a compound product and it might be reasonable to talk 
about a pricing strategy which would cover all aspects of on demand product.   
6.3 Suggestions for further research 
Video on demand is a relatively new research area. It offers a wide area for both theoretical 
and empirical analysis. Here I will outline some of the directions for further studies.  
An empirical research on customers’ willingness to pay, applied to different/larger 
respondent samples could supplement this study and reveal more nuances in consumption 
patterns. Besides, a thorough mapping of customer preferences would open a door to 
opportunities for sophisticated pricing techniques and better customer targeting.  
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Furthermore, video on demand concept offers a wide range of topics for further research. It 
includes studies on different aspects of on demand services as well as composition of a 
product of which movies is only an integrated part. 
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Appendix 
1. Survey questions 
1 Hvor ofte går du på kino? 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 
 Sjeldent 
 Aldri 
  
2 Hvor ofte kjøper du filmer på DVD/Blue-ray? 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 
 Sjeldent 
 Aldri 
  
3 Hvor ofte leier du filmer (i en butikk og lignende)? 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 
 Sjeldent 
 Aldri 
  
4 Hvor ofte leier du filmer via din TV-leverandør? 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 
 Sjeldent 
 Aldri 
  
5 Hvor mye forbruker du på filmkjøp (DVD/Blue-ray) i gjennomsnitt per måned? 
 Ingenting 
 < NOK 100 
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 
 > NOK 500 
  
6 Hvor mye forbruker du på å leie filmer i gjennomsnitt per måned? 
 Ingenting 
 < NOK 100 
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 
 > NOK 500 
  
7 Hvilken måte å se film på foretrekker du? 
 Kino 
 Kjøp DVD/Blue-ray 
 Leie DVD/Blue-ray i butikk 
 Leie film via TV-leverandør 
 Nedlasting fra internett (gratis) 
 Streaming fra internet mot betaling  
(SFAnytime, iTunes og lignende) 
 TV (free broadcasting, NOT paid channels) 
 Streaming fra internett gratis 
 Ikke interessert i film 
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8 Hvordan bestemmer du deg for å se en film? 
 Anbefalinger fra venner og lignende 
 Velger filmnyheter 
 Velger anerkjente toppfilmer 
 Valget er tilfeldig 
 Omtale 
 Det barna vil se på kino 
 Skuespiller/sjanger 
 Reklame 
 Ikke interessert i film 
  
9 Velg filmkategori 
 Action 
 Drama 
 Familie 
 Komedie 
 Thriller 
  
 
I neste del blir det presentert en rekke filmtitler. Filmtitlene er delt inn i 5 kategorier. Velg kategorien du er interessert i. Det 
er mulig å velge flere kategorier.  
NB! En kategori inneholder 15 filmtitler og det tar ca. 10-13 min. å gå gjennom disse. Velger du flere kategorier, kan det ta 
lengre tid å besvare undersøkelsen. 
Du er bedt om å angi det MAKSIMALE beløpet (i NOK) du er villig til å betale for å LEIE denne filmen direkte til din TV 
fra en LOVLIG kilde. Tenk deg at du ikke eier denne filmen og at den blir tilgjengelig med en gang du vil se den.  
Skriv hvor mye filmen er verdt for DEG, ikke beløpet du tenker er rettferdig eller vanlig å betale.  
Hvis du ikke er interessert i å se denne filmen skriv 0.  
(The movie titles were presented here with a poster, a short description of the plot and information about starring actors, 
director, production studio, year of release. The respondent was asked to fill inn the amount he/she was willing to pay for 
the movie) 
(The next set of questions was presented after the questions about movie valuations were answered): 
10 Hvilke faktorer kunne øke beløpene du har oppgitt i øvrige spørsmålene? 
 Film har HD (high definition) - kvalitet 
 Film er tilgjengelig i 3D 
 Anledning til å lagre filmen til privat bruk 
 God filmutvalg 
 Tilgjengelig tidlig 
 Varighet på leie (filmen er tilgjengelig lenger) 
 Ingenting 
  
11 Hvor ofte ser du ekstramateriale som finnes på DVD? 
 Aldri 
 Noen ganger 
 Alltid 
 Sjeldent 
  
12 Hvor mange timer om dagen ser du på TV? 
 Mindre enn 1 
 1 til 3 
 3 til 5 
 Mere enn 5 
  
13 Hva er din alder? 
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 18-25 
 26-35 
 36-45 
 > 45 
  
14 Kjønn 
 Kvinne 
 Mann 
  
15 Hva er bruttoinntekten i husholdningen? 
 < 400 000 
 400 000 til 800 000 
 > 800 000 
  
16 Hvor mange personer er det i husholdningen? 
 1 
 2 
 3 til 4 
 5 eller flere 
  
17 Har du barn? 
 Ja 
 Nei 
  
18 Hva er barnas/barnets alder? 
 Under 6 
 6 – 11 
 12 – 15 
 Over 15 
  
19 Har du noen gang leid film via TV-leverandør? 
 Ja 
 Nei 
  
20 Hvis ikke - hvorfor? 
 Er ikke vant til å bruke denne tjenesten 
 Kjenner ikke til tilbudet 
 Bruker billigere alternativer 
 Vanskelig å bruke denne tjenesten 
 Ikke interessert i film 
 Har ikke behov 
 Gidder ikke 
 Dårlig kvalitet 
 Dyrt 
 Foretrekker DVD og kino 
  
21 Kunne du tenke deg å leie film via din TV-leverandør i framtiden? 
 Ja 
 Nei 
 Vet ikke 
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2. Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of movie valuations, raw data 
 
Figure 2: Overall demand curve, raw data 
 
Figure 3: Single-price revenue function, raw data  
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Figure 4: Fit of the observed data to lognormal distribution (program used: Sigmaplot12) 
 
Figure 5: Pairwise correlations of song valuations, action 
 
Fig 6: Valuations across individuals (for any number of movies n, the figures show the 25
th
, 
50
th
, and 75
th 
percentile of the distribution of the valuations of the n movies that the 
respondents value most) 
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Figure 7: Distribution of movie valuations, category action  
    
    
Figure 8: Overall demand curve, category action 
    
 
Figure 9: Single-price revenue function, category action  
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3. Tables 
Table 1: Prices of movies on demand available in Norway (prices pr.25.03.12)       
      
Provider Movie charachteristic Price per movie, NOK 
            
Altibox New and popular 49       
http://www.altibox.no/ Older/less popular 39       
  New and popular/HD 79       
  Older/HD 59       
            
CDON.no New and popular 39       
http://cdon.no/ Older/less popular 29 19 9 free 
            
Film2home New and popular 49 39     
http://www.film2home.no/no.aspx Older/less popular 29 19     
            
Filmweb online New and popular 39 35     
http://www.filmweb.no/online/ Older/less popular 29 19     
            
NextGenTel (broadpark) New and popular 
max 
59       
http://www.nextgentel.no/privat/tv/interaktiv/filmkiosk/ Older/less popular min 9       
            
SF Anytime New and popular 39       
http://sfanytime.com/nb-NO/ Older/less popular 35 25     
  New and popular/HD 55       
  Older/HD 39       
            
Voddler  New and popular 37       
http://www.voddler.com/ Older/less popular 27 19     
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Table 2: Movie list                 
          
Nr. Title Category Year 
Premiere 
 in Norway  
(source: filmweb) 
DVD 
available  
at the time 
of survey 
Filmweb  
(max 6) 
Date for  
information 
gathering 
IMDB   
(max 
10) 
% liked  
Flixter 
1 Jørgen+Anne=sant Family 2011 25.02.2011 No 5,3 02.05.11 6,9 n/a 
2 Megahjerne Family 2010 25.12.2010 Yes 4,23 02.05.11 7,3 74 % 
3 Gråtass får en ny venn Family 2011 18.02.2011 No 4,42 02.05.11 n/a n/a 
4 Prinsessen og frosken Family 2009 19.02.2010 Yes 4,87 02.05.11 7,3 72 % 
5 Rango Family 2011 04.03.2011 No 4,78 02.05.11 7,7 73 % 
6 Til Huttetuenes land Family 2009 22.01.2010 Yes 4,74 08.04.11 7,1 59 % 
7 Grusomme meg Family 2010 15.10.2010 Yes 4,98 02.05.11 7,5 81 % 
8 Sammys eventyr Family 2010 05.11.2010 Yes 4,31 02.05.11 6 31 % 
9 Gnomeo and Julie Family 2011 11.03.2011 No 4,88 02.05.11 5,7 58 % 
10 Dragetreneren Family 2009 26.03.2010 Yes 4,96 02.05.11 8,2 90 % 
11 Se opp Family 2009 25.09.2009 Yes 5,09 01.05.11 8,4 86 % 
12 
Legenden on Narnia - Reisen til det 
ytterste hav Family 2010 25.12.2010 Yes 4,87 02.05.11 6,5 67 % 
13 Den fantastiske Mikkel Rev Family 2009 05.02.2010 Yes 4,7 01.05.11 7,9 79 % 
14 Toy Story 3 Family 2010 27.08.2010 Yes 5,38 02.05.11 7,8 91 % 
15 Rio Family 2011 08.04.2011 No 5,1 02.05.11 7 82 % 
16 Inception Action 2010 21.07.2010 Yes 5,28 01.05.11 8,9 93 % 
17 Thor Action 2011 29.04.2011 No 4,92 01.05.11 7,8 n/a 
18 Avatar Action 2009 18.12.2009 Yes 5,49 01.05.11 8,2 92 % 
19 World Invasion: Battle Los Angeles Action 2011 08.04.2011 No 4,57 01.05.11 6,3 57 % 
20 Red Action 2010 05.11.2010 Yes 5,12 01.05.11 7,1 73 % 
21 Unstoppable Action 2010 12.11.2010 Yes 4,52 01.05.11 6,9 73 % 
22 Trolljegeren Action 2010 29.10.2010 Yes 5,23 01.05.11 7,3 n/a 
23 Takers Action 2010 05.11.2010 Yes 5,46 04.04.11 5,8 57 % 
24 Salt Action 2010 03.09.2010 Yes 4,83 01.05.11 6,5 62 % 
25 The Adjustment Bureau Action 2010 25.03.2011 No 4,35 01.05.11 7,2 69 % 
26 Knight and Day Action 2010 16.07.2010 Yes 4,97 01.05.11 6,4 52 % 
27 Tomorrow, When the War Began Action 2010 15.04.2011 No 5,02 02.05.11 6,3 n/a 
28 Harry Potter og Dødstalismanene Action 2010 19.11.2010 Yes 5,59 08.04.11 7,8 87 % 
29 The Town Action 2010 26.12.2010 Yes 4,95 01.05.11 7,7 84 % 
30 The A-team Action 2010 18.06.2010 Yes 5,28 06.04.11 7 n/a 
31 Dinner for Schmucks Comedy 2010 03.09.2010 Yes 4,56 01.05.11 6 48 % 
32 Just Go with It Comedy 2011 25.02.2011 No 5,06 01.05.11 6,2 73 % 
33 No Strings Attached Comedy 2011 18.03.2011 No 4,74 01.05.11 6,3 n/a 
34 Did you hear about Morgans? Comedy 2009 29.01.2010 Yes 4,4 01.05.11 4,4 31 % 
35 Valentine's Day Comedy 2010 12.02.2010 Yes 5,03 01.05.11 5,7 54 % 
36 Grown ups Comedy 2010 24.09.2010 Yes 5,17 01.05.11 5,8 59 % 
37 Hangover Comedy 2009 19.06.2009 Yes 5,47 02.05.11 7,9 87 % 
38 It's Complicated Comedy 2009 26.12.2009 Yes 4,6 01.05.11 6,6 63 % 
39 Verre enn vers Comedy 2010 22.12.2010 No 4,98 02.05.11 5,3 43 % 
40 Due Date Comedy 2010 03.12.2010 Yes 4,91 01.05.11 6,7 58 % 
41 Klovn-The Movie Comedy 2010 25.03.2011 No 4,92 01.05.11 7,9 n/a 
42 Sykt lykkelig Comedy 2010 05.11.2010 Yes 4,46 01.05.11 7,7 n/a 
43 Zombieland Comedy 2009 23.10.2009 Yes 5,4 02.05.11 7,8 87 % 
44 UMEÅ4ever Comedy 2010 01.04.2011 No 4,58 01.05.11 n/a n/a 
45 Love and Other Drugs Comedy 2010 21.01.2011 No 4,78 01.05.11 6,6 56 % 
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46 Kongens Tale Drama 2010 11.02.2011 No 5,12 01.05.11 8,4 94 % 
47 Jeg reiser alene Drama 2010 11.02.2011 No 4,9 01.05.11 7,2 n/a 
48 A Single Man Drama 2009 12.02.2010 Yes 4,3 02.05.11 7,6 78 % 
49 Extraodinary measures Drama 2010 16.04.2010 Yes 5,5 01.05.11 6,4 55 % 
50 Spis elsk lev Drama 2010 01.10.2010 Yes 4,33 01.05.11 5,2 47 % 
51 Black Swan Drama 2010 04.02.2011 No 5 01.05.11 8,5 86 % 
52 Kongen av Bastøy Drama 2010 17.12.2010 No 5,15 01.05.11 7,4 n/a 
53 Country Strong Drama 2010 15.04.2011 No 4,23 02.05.11 5,8 62 % 
54 127 Hours Drama 2010 11.02.2011 No 5,01 01.05.11 8 85 % 
55 Cornelis Drama 2010 12.11.2010 Yes 4,89 01.05.11 6,7 n/a 
56 Dear John Drama 2010 11.06.2010 Yes 5,35 01.05.11 5,9 66 % 
57 True grit - et ekte mannfolk Drama 2010 18.02.2011 No 4,84 01.05.11 8 87 % 
58 Public Enemies Drama 2009 24.07.2009 Yes 4,48 02.05.11 7,1 65 % 
59 The Social Network Drama 2010 22.10.2010 Yes 5 01.05.11 8,1 89 % 
60 I en bedre verden Drama 2010 24.09.2010 Yes 5,35 02.05.11 7,7 n/a 
61 I Am Number Four Thriller 2011 18.03.2011 No 5,05 01.05.11 6,3 65 % 
62 Varg Veum -Svarte får Thriller 2010 21.01.2011 Yes 3,91 01.05.11 6 n/a 
63 Skyline Thriller 2010 10.12.2010 Yes 4,04 17.04.11 4,5 20 % 
64 Nokas Thriller 2010 01.10.2010 Yes 4,99 01.05.11 5,9 n/a 
65 Stone Thriller 2010 01.10.2010 Yes 4 01.05.11 6,9 21 % 
66 Green Zone Thriller 2010 12.03.2010 Yes 5,04 01.05.11 7 60 % 
67 The Rite Thriller 2011 11.03.2011 No 4,43 01.05.11 6,1 51 % 
68 22 bullets Thriller 2010 
15.12.2010 (Sweden, 
DVD) Yes 5 02.05.11 6,7 53 % 
69 Shutter Island Thriller 2010 19.02.2010 Yes 4,84 01.05.11 8 73 % 
70 Piranha Thriller 2010 22.10.2010 Yes 4,91 01.05.11 6 45 % 
71 The Next Three Days Thriller   03.12.2010 Yes 4,88 02.05.11 7,4 66 % 
72 Skyggen (The ghost writer) Thriller 2009 26.03.2010 Yes 4,6 01.05.11 7,2 68 % 
73 Tron: Legacy Thriller 2010 17.12.2010 Yes 5,32 01.05.11 7,1 67 % 
74 Varg Veum - dødens drabanter Thriller 2011 08.04.2011 No 5 02.05.11 6,7 n/a 
75 Let Me In Thriller 2010 01.04.2011 No 
6 (by 1 
viewer) 01.05.11 7,3 74 % 
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Table 3: Summary of survey selection     
    
1 Hvor ofte går du på kino? N % 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 2 0.4% 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 6 1.3% 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 42 8.8% 
 Sjeldent 368 76.8% 
 Aldri 61 12.7% 
 Total 479 100% 
    
2 Hvor ofte kjøper du filmer på DVD/Blue-ray? N % 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 8 1.7% 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 12 2.5% 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 96 20.0% 
 Sjeldent 268 55.9% 
 Aldri 95 19.8% 
 Total 479 100% 
    
3 Hvor ofte leier du filmer (i en butikk og lignende)? N % 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 4 0.8% 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 15 3.1% 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 28 5.9% 
 Sjeldent 178 37.3% 
 Aldri 252 52.8% 
 Total 477 100% 
    
4 Hvor ofte leier du filmer via din TV-leverandør? N % 
 Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i måneden 1 0.2% 
 3-4 ganger i måneden 5 1.1% 
 1-2 ganger i måneden 13 2.7% 
 Sjeldent 82 17.2% 
 Aldri 375 78.8% 
 Total 476 100% 
    
5 
Hvor mye forbruker du på filmkjøp (DVD/Blue-ray) 
 i gjennomsnitt per måned? N % 
 Ingenting 54 11.3% 
 < NOK 100 303 63.3% 
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 86 18.0% 
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 31 6.5% 
 > NOK 500 5 1.0% 
 Total 479 100% 
    
6 
Hvor mye forbruker du på å leie filmer 
 i gjennomsnitt per måned? N % 
 Ingenting 98 20.5% 
 < NOK 100 333 69.7% 
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 39 8.2% 
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 5 1.0% 
 > NOK 500 3 0.6% 
 Total 478 100% 
    
7 Hvilken måte å se film på foretrekker du? N % 
 Kino 272 56.8% 
 Kjøp DVD/Blue-ray 187 39.0% 
 Leie DVD/Blue-ray i butikk 61 12.7% 
 Leie film via TV-leverandør 36 7.5% 
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 Nedlasting fra internett (gratis) 83 17.3% 
 Streaming fra internet mot betaling  
(SFAnytime, iTunes og lignende) 37 7.7% 
 TV (free broadcasting, NOT paid channels) 92 19.2% 
 Streaming fra internett gratis 2 0.4% 
 Ikke interessert i film 7 1.5% 
    
8 Hvordan bestemmer du deg for å se en film? N % 
 Anbefalinger fra venner og lignende 150 31.3% 
 Velger filmnyheter 137 28.6% 
 Velger anerkjente toppfilmer 150 31.3% 
 Valget er tilfeldig 170 35.5% 
 Omtale 11 2.3% 
 Det barna vil se på kino 3 0.6% 
 Skuespiller/sjanger 4 0.8% 
 Reklame 1 0.2% 
 Ikke interessert i film 4 0.8% 
    
9 Velg filmkategori N % 
 Action 264 55.1% 
 Drama 144 30.1% 
 Familie 73 15.2% 
 Komedie 199 41.5% 
 Thriller 155 32.4% 
    
    
10 
Hvilke faktorer kunne øke beløpene 
 du har oppgitt i øvrige spørsmålene? N % 
 Film har HD (high definition) - kvalitet 186 38.8% 
 Film er tilgjengelig i 3D 58 12.1% 
 Anledning til å lagre filmen til privat bruk 198 41.3% 
 God filmutvalg 16 3.3% 
 Tilgjengelig tidlig 1 0.2% 
 Varighet på leie (filmen er tilgjengelig lenger) 1 0.2% 
 Ingenting 38 7.9% 
    
11 
Hvor ofte ser du ekstramateriale 
 som finnes på DVD? N % 
 Aldri 192 40.5% 
 Noen ganger 250 52.7% 
 Alltid 27 5.7% 
 Sjeldent 5 1.1% 
 Total 474 100% 
    
12 Hvor mange timer om dagen ser du på TV? N % 
 Mindre enn 1 81 16.9% 
 1 til 3 298 62.2% 
 3 til 5 83 17.3% 
 Mere enn 5 17 3.5% 
 Total 479 100% 
    
13 Hva er din alder? N % 
 18-25 9 1.9% 
 26-35 60 12.6% 
 36-45 137 28.7% 
 > 45 271 56.8% 
 Total 477 100% 
    
14 Kjønn N % 
 Kvinne 99 26.4% 
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 Mann 375 79.1% 
 Total 474 100% 
    
15 Hva er bruttoinntekten i husholdningen? N % 
 < 400 000 87 19.1% 
 400 000 til 800 000 215 47.1% 
 > 800 000 154 33.8% 
 Total 456 100% 
    
16 Hvor mange personer er det i husholdningen? N % 
 1 58 12.3% 
 2 202 42.7% 
 3 til 4 159 33.6% 
 5 eller flere 54 11.4% 
 Total 473 100% 
    
17 Har du barn? N % 
 Ja 335 81.5% 
 Nei 76 18.5% 
 Total 411 100% 
    
18 Hva er barnas/barnets alder? N % 
 Under 6 72 21.5% 
 6 – 11 84 25.1% 
 12 – 15 77 23.0% 
 Over 15 212 63.3% 
    
19 Har du noen gang leid film via TV-leverandør?* N % 
 Ja 17 5.9% 
 Nei 270 94.1% 
 Total 287 100% 
    
20 Hvis ikke - hvorfor?* N % 
 Er ikke vant til å bruke denne tjenesten 104 38.5% 
 Kjenner ikke til tilbudet 47 17.4% 
 Bruker billigere alternativer 40 14.8% 
 Vanskelig å bruke denne tjenesten 11 4.1% 
 Ikke interessert i film 24 8.9% 
 Har ikke behov 37 13.7% 
 Gidder ikke 3 1.1% 
 Dårlig kvalitet 4 1.5% 
 Dyrt 3 1.1% 
 Foretrekker DVD og kino 3 1.1% 
    
21 Kunne du tenke deg å leie film 
 via din TV-leverandør i framtiden?* N % 
 Ja 161 59.6% 
 Nei 102 37.8% 
 Vet ikke 7 2.6% 
 Total 270 100% 
    
* The number of the respondents who answered these questions  
 is lower than the previous ones. The reason is that the    
 respondents were divided in two groups: active CD customers   
 and passive CD customers. Passive customers are those who have   
 stopped their subscription within the last 2 years. The questions   
 19-21 were asked only to the active customers.   
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Table 4: Valuations of the songs                 
Percentile 0.50 % 0.15 % 0.25 % 0.50 % 0.75 % 0.90 % 0.93 % 0.95 % 0.98 % mean median 
Valuation, NOK 10 15 20 35 50 60 75 100 150 37,34 35,00 
 
Table 5: Pairwise correlations of movie valuations by categories 
Category 
Average 
correlation of  
movie valuations      
Action 0.77228      
Comedy 0.80089      
Drama 0.78099      
Family 0.87454      
Thriller 0.82637      
 
Table 6: Number of observations by categories 
Movie category 
Nr. of observations 
(all) 
Nr. of observations 
(positive) 
Action 3990 1824 
Comedy 2965 1055 
Drama  2167 908 
Family 1095 423 
Thriller 2266 974 
 
Table 7: Pearson correlation by categories (movie ratings vs movie valuations) 
Movie category Pearson correlation p-value    
Action 0.643 0.010    
Comedy 0.271 0.328    
Drama  0.862 0.000    
Family -0.164 0.560    
Thriller -0.194 0.489    
 
Table 8: Alternative  pricing techniques, raw data       
Pricing technique 
PS  
share 
CS  
share 
DWL  
share %∆PS %∆CS %∆DWL 
Uniform pricing 0.50513 0.33128 0.16359       
Component pricing (movie) 0.52040 0.24631 0.23330 0.03  (0.26) 0.43  
Pure bundling 15 movies 0.44497 0.29661 0.25841 (0.12) (0.10) 0.58  
Two-part tariff 0.64422 0.26278 0.09300 0.28  (0.21) (0.43) 
 
 
 77 
Table 9: Alternative  pricing techniques, parametric data     
Pricing technique 
PS  
share 
CS  
share 
DWL  
share %∆PS %∆CS %∆DWL 
Uniform pricing 0.43470 0.37932 0.18598       
Component pricing 0.43793 0.37985 0.18223 0.01  0.00  (0.02) 
Pure bundling 0.43726 0.38513 0.17762 0.01  0.02  (0.04) 
Bundling 3 movies 0.40305 0.37703 0.21992 (0.07) (0.01) 0.18  
Bundling 5 movies 0.40944 0.38747 0.20309 (0.06) 0.02  0.09  
Two-part tariff 0.59380 0.26363 0.14257 0.37  (0.30) (0.23) 
 
Table 10: Breakdown of surplus, parametric data by categories (uniform pricing) 
Movie category 
PS  
share 
CS  
share 
DWL  
share  
Action 0.43470 0.37932 0.18598  
Drama 0.44931 0.36122 0.18946  
Comedy 0.41925 0.36793 0.21282  
Family 0.42633 0.36549 0.20817  
Thriller 0.42943 0.36489 0.20568  
 
Table 11: Category-specific revenue maximizing prices, raw data   
Movie category Family Action Comedy Drama Thriller    
Price, NOK 40 30 30 30 30    
 
 
Table 12: Component pricing: movie-specific revenue maximizing prices, parametric data 
Movie number 
Revenue  
max.  
price, NOK   
1 27   
2 26   
3 26   
4 20   
5 26   
6 24   
7 25   
8 28   
9 24   
10 25   
11 28   
12 18   
13 26   
14 23   
15 25   
Comment: Movie numbers in the table do not correspond to the movie numbers in Table 2. Since the data is simulated, the movie title 
here is of little interest. The spread of revenue maximizing prices across movies presents the main interest in this table.
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Table 13: Chi - squared test for contingency table: the input data 
  
  
       
Comment: The tables used in chi-square test are grouped by the hypothesis. The first table  
presents the raw data. In most of the cases some transformations have been made to make   
the data satisfy "the rule of five". The adjusted table (with combined rows, columns   
or both) is presented below the table with raw data. The table used in the test is marked   
with grid. The tables are in Norwegian as it is the language of the survey.   
       
Hypothesis 1: The frequency of movie rental is independent of gender    
  Kvinne Mann    
 
Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i 
måneden 0 3    
 3-4 ganger i måneden 6 9    
 1-2 ganger i måneden 3 25    
 Sjeldent 35 133    
 Aldri 52 188    
       
(table with combined 
rows)  Kvinne Mann    
 Ofte  9 37    
 Sjeldent 35 133    
 Aldri 52 188    
       
Hypothesis 2: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of gender    
  Kvinne Mann    
 < NOK 100 58 260    
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 7 31    
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 1 3    
 > NOK 500 1 2    
 Ingenting 29 63    
       
(table with combined 
rows)  Kvinne Mann    
 Ingenting 29 63    
 Litt 58 260    
 Noe 9 36    
       
Hypothesis 3: The stated wtp is independent of gender    
 Wtp Kvinne  Mann    
 0 31 145    
 NOK 1 - NOK 10 14 42    
 NOK 11 - NOK 25 18 79    
 NOK 26 - NOK35 12 39    
 >NOK 35 21 55    
       
(table with combined 
rows)       
 0 31 145    
 NOK 1 - NOK 10 14 42    
 NOK 11 - NOK 25 18 79    
 NOK 26 - NOK35 12 39    
 >NOK 35 21 55    
       
Hypothesis 4: The choice of movie category is independent of gender    
  Kvinne Mann    
 Action 31 223    
 Comedy 40 148    
 Drama 50 85    
 Familie 25 46    
 Thriller 26 119    
       
Hypothesis 5: The frequency of movie rental is independent of age     
  18-25 26-35 36-45 > 45  
 
Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i 
måneden 1 0 2 0  
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 3-4 ganger i måneden 1 6 5 3  
 1-2 ganger i måneden 0 1 6 12  
 Sjeldent 4 19 61 85  
 Aldri 3 24 53 161  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   18-35 36-45 >45  
 Ofte  9 13 15  
 Sjeldent  23 61 85  
 Aldri  27 53 161  
       
Hypothesis 6: The amount spent on the movie rental is independent of age  
  18-25 26-35 36-45 > 45  
 < NOK 100 6 40 97 176  
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 2 8 14 14  
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 0 1 2 1  
 > NOK 500 0 2 1 0  
 Ingenting 1 9 13 70  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   18-35 36-45 >45  
 Ingenting  10 13 70  
 Litt  46 97 176  
 Noe  13 17 15  
       
Hypothesis 7: The stated wtp is independent of age        
  18-25 26-35 36-45 > 45  
 Wtp      
 0 1 9 38 130  
 NOK 1 - NOK 10 1 7 16 32  
 NOK 11 - NOK 25 4 20 27 46  
 NOK 26 - NOK35 1 10 21 20  
 >NOK 35 2 14 25 34  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   18-35 36-45 > 45  
 0  10 38 130  
 NOK 1 - NOK 10  8 16 32  
 NOK 11 - NOK 25  24 27 46  
 NOK 26 - NOK35  11 21 20  
 >NOK 35  16 25 34  
       
Hypothesis 8: The choice of movie category is independent of age    
  18-25 26-35 36-45 > 45  
 Action 5 45 98 107  
 Comedy 4 35 59 92  
 Drama 2 13 31 90  
 Familie  10 20 41  
 Thriller 1 28 48 69  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   18-35 36-45 > 45  
 Action  50 98 107  
 Comedy  39 59 92  
 Drama  15 31 90  
 Familie  10 20 41  
 Thriller  29 48 69  
       
Hypothesis 9: The frequency of movie rental is independent of age of children  
  
Under 
6 6 - 11 12 - 15 
Over 
15  
 
Oftere enn 3-4 ganger i 
måneden 0 1 1 0  
 3-4 ganger i måneden 5 1 0 4  
 1-2 ganger i måneden 4 3 2 12  
 Sjeldent 10 20 19 69  
 Aldri 13 23 14 117  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   Småbarn Eldre barn   
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 Ofte  14 19   
 Sjeldent  30 88   
 Aldri  36 131   
       
Hypothesis 10: The amount spent on the movie rental is independent of the age of children  
  
Under 
6 6 - 11 12 - 15 
Over 
15  
 < NOK 100 20 34 30 139  
 NOK 100 til NOK 300 6 6 3 13  
 NOK 301 til NOK 500 0 0 0 2  
 > NOK 500 0 1 0 0  
 Ingenting 6 7 3 48  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   Småbarn Eldre barn  
 Ingenting  13 51   
 Litt  54 169   
 Noe  13 18   
       
Hypothesis 11: The stated wtp is independent of the age of children    
  
Under 
6 6 - 11 12 - 15 
Over 
15  
 Wtp      
 0 5 13 11 98  
 NOK 1 - NOK 10 2 5 6 23  
 NOK 11 - NOK 25 14 12 12 33  
 NOK 26 - NOK35 5 6 4 20  
 >NOK 35 6 12 3 28  
       
(table with combined 
rows)   Småbarn Eldre barn  
 0  18 109   
 NOK 1 - NOK 10  7 29   
 NOK 11 - NOK 25  26 45   
 NOK 26 - NOK35  11 24   
 >NOK 35  18 31   
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4. MINITAB output 
4.1 Pearson correlation: movie ratings vs movie valuations 
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, all movies 
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = 0,321 
P-Value = 0,005 
 
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, family 
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = -0,164 
P-Value = 0,560 
 
  
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, action 
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = 0,643 
P-Value = 0,010 
 
  
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, comedy 
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = 0,271 
P-Value = 0,328 
 
  
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, drama 
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = 0,862 
P-Value = 0,000 
 
  
Correlation: Ratings; Valuations, thriller  
 
Pearson correlation of Ratings and Valuations = -0,194 
P-Value = 0,489 
 
  
4.2 Regression on movie and individual effects 
Regression Analysis: logval versus respid; movie  
 
The regression equation is 
logval = 3,55 + 0,000404 respid - 0,00301 movie 
 
 
Predictor       Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant      3,5522     0,1007  35,28  0,000 
respid     0,0004038  0,0001175   3,44  0,001 
movie      -0,003010   0,001243  -2,42  0,016 
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S = 0,682883   R-Sq = 1,0%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,8% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF        SS      MS     F      P 
Regression         2    8,1968  4,0984  8,79  0,000 
Residual Error  1821  849,1853  0,4663 
Total           1823  857,3821 
 
 
Regression Analysis: logval versus movie  
 
The regression equation is 
logval = 3,65 - 0,00299 movie 
 
 
Predictor       Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant     3,64616   0,09717  37,52  0,000 
movie      -0,002987  0,001247  -2,40  0,017 
 
 
S = 0,684905   R-Sq = 0,3%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,3% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF        SS      MS     F      P 
Regression         1    2,6918  2,6918  5,74  0,017 
Residual Error  1822  854,6903  0,4691 
Total           1823  857,3821 
 
 
Regression Analysis: logval versus respid  
 
The regression equation is 
logval = 3,32 + 0,000402 respid 
 
 
Predictor       Coef    SE Coef       T      P 
Constant     3,32120    0,03217  103,25  0,000 
respid     0,0004023  0,0001177    3,42  0,001 
 
 
S = 0,683793   R-Sq = 0,6%   R-Sq(adj) = 0,6% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF        SS      MS      F      P 
Regression         1    5,4642  5,4642  11,69  0,001 
Residual Error  1822  851,9179  0,4676 
Total           1823  857,3821 
 
4.3 Chi-squared test of a contingency table 
H1: The frequency of movie rental is independent of gender. 
Chi-Square Test: Female; Male  
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Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
      Female    Male  Total 
    1      9      37     46 
        9,73   36,27 
       0,054   0,015 
 
    2     35     133    168 
       35,52  132,48 
       0,008   0,002 
 
    3     52     188    240 
       50,75  189,25 
       0,031   0,008 
 
Total     96     358    454 
 
Chi-Sq = 0,118; DF = 2; P-Value = 0,943 
 
H2: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of gender. 
Chi-Square Test: Female; Male  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
        Female   Male  Total 
    1     29      63     92 
       19,41   72,59 
       4,737   1,267 
 
    2     58     260    318 
       67,09  250,91 
       1,233   0,330 
 
    3      9      36     45 
        9,49   35,51 
       0,026   0,007 
 
Total     96     359    455 
 
Chi-Sq = 7,599; DF = 2; P-Value = 0,022 
 
 
H3: The stated willingness to pay is independent of gender 
 
Chi-Square Test: Female; Male  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
       Female    Male  Total 
    1     31     145    176 
       37,05  138,95 
       0,989   0,264 
 
    2     14      42     56 
       11,79   44,21 
       0,414   0,111 
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    3     18      79     97 
       20,42   76,58 
       0,287   0,077 
 
    4     12      39     51 
       10,74   40,26 
       0,149   0,040 
 
    5     21      55     76 
       16,00   60,00 
       1,563   0,417 
 
Total     96     360    456 
 
Chi-Sq = 4,308; DF = 4; P-Value = 0,366 
 
 
H4: The choice of movie category is independent of gender. 
Chi-Square Test: Female; Male 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
         Female   Male  Total 
    1      31     223    254 
        55,09  198,91 
       10,536   2,918 
 
    2      40     148    188 
        40,78  147,22 
        0,015   0,004 
 
    3      50      85    135 
        29,28  105,72 
       14,660   4,060 
 
    4      25      46     71 
        15,40   55,60 
        5,985   1,658 
 
    5      26     119    145 
        31,45  113,55 
        0,944   0,262 
 
Total     172     621    793 
 
Chi-Sq = 41,042; DF = 4; P-Value = 0,000 
 
 
H5: The frequency of movie rental is independent of age. 
Chi-Square Test: Young; Mid; Older 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
        Young   Mid    Older  Total 
    1      9     13      15     37 
        4,88  10,51   21,60 
       3,470  0,589   2,019 
 
    2     23     61      85    169 
       22,31  48,02   98,68 
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       0,022  3,511   1,896 
 
    3     27     53     161    241 
       31,81  68,47  140,72 
       0,727  3,496   2,923 
 
Total     59    127     261    447 
 
Chi-Sq = 18,652; DF = 4; P-Value = 0,001 
1 cells with expected counts less than 5. 
 
 
H6: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of age 
Chi-Square Test: Young; Mid; Older  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
        Young   Mid   Older  Total 
    1     10     13      70     93 
       14,04  25,84   53,11 
       1,163  6,384   5,369 
 
    2     46     97     176    319 
       48,16  88,65  182,19 
       0,097  0,787   0,210 
 
    3     13     17      15     45 
        6,79  12,51   25,70 
       5,668  1,615   4,455 
 
Total     69    127     261    457 
 
Chi-Sq = 25,748; DF = 4; P-Value = 0,000 
 
 
H7: The stated willingness to pay is independent of age 
 
Chi-Square Test: Young; Mid; Older  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
        Young    Mid   Older  Total 
    1      10     38     130    178 
        26,82  49,36  101,83 
       10,546  2,614   7,796 
 
    2       8     16      32     56 
         8,44  15,53   32,03 
        0,023  0,014   0,000 
 
    3      24     27      46     97 
        14,61  26,90   55,49 
        6,029  0,000   1,623 
 
    4      11     21      20     52 
         7,83  14,42   29,75 
        1,279  3,003   3,194 
 
    5      16     25      34     75 
        11,30  20,80   42,90 
        1,956  0,849   1,848 
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Total      69    127     262    458 
 
Chi-Sq = 40,774; DF = 8; P-Value = 0,000 
 
 
 
H8: The choice of movie category is independent of age. 
Chi-Square Test: Young; Mid; Older 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
       Young    Mid    Older  Total 
    1     50     98     107    255 
       45,70  81,80  127,50 
       0,405  3,206   3,296 
 
    2     39     59      92    190 
       34,05  60,95   95,00 
       0,720  0,063   0,095 
 
    3     15     31      90    136 
       24,37  43,63   68,00 
       3,603  3,656   7,118 
 
    4     10     20      41     71 
       12,72  22,78   35,50 
       0,583  0,339   0,852 
 
    5     29     48      69    146 
       26,16  46,84   73,00 
       0,308  0,029   0,219 
 
Total    143    256     399    798 
 
Chi-Sq = 24,491; DF = 8; P-Value = 0,002 
 
H9: The frequency of movie rental is independent of the age of children 
 
Chi-Square Test: Small; Older  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
       Small   Older  Total 
    1     14      19     33 
        8,30   24,70 
       3,911   1,315 
 
    2     30      88    118 
       29,69   88,31 
       0,003   0,001 
 
    3     36     131    167 
       42,01  124,99 
       0,860   0,289 
 
Total     80     238    318 
 
Chi-Sq = 6,380; DF = 2; P-Value = 0,041 
 
 
H10: The amount spent on movie rental is independent of the age of children  
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Chi-Square Test: Small; Older  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
       Small   Older  Total 
    1     13      51     64 
       16,10   47,90 
       0,597   0,201 
 
    2     54     169    223 
       56,10  166,90 
       0,079   0,026 
 
    3     13      18     31 
        7,80   23,20 
       3,469   1,166 
 
Total     80     238    318 
 
Chi-Sq = 5,538; DF = 2; P-Value = 0,063 
 
H11: The stated willingness to pay is independent of the age of children 
 
Chi-Square Test: Small; Older  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
       Small   Older  Total 
    1     18    109    127 
       31,95  95,05 
       6,091  2,047 
 
    2      7     29     36 
        9,06  26,94 
       0,467  0,157 
 
    3     26     45     71 
       17,86  53,14 
       3,708  1,246 
 
    4     11     24     35 
        8,81  26,19 
       0,547  0,184 
 
    5     18     31     49 
       12,33  36,67 
       2,611  0,878 
 
Total     80    238    318 
 
Chi-Sq = 17,936; DF = 4; P-Value = 0,001 
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5. STATA commands 
Commands which were used to simulate the dataset with observations from 5000 
respondents are presented in this section. 
* Respid denotes the number of respondent 
insheet using "C:\Master\data.csv", delimit(;) 
drop if respid==. 
destring, replace 
drop status 
rename category cat 
 
* The next series of commands is run on the category action which has nr.2 
 
keep if cat==2 
save "C:\Master\cat2.dta", replace 
keep movie 
sort movie 
duplicates drop 
gen movie1=_n 
distinct movie 
distinct movie1 
merge m:m movie using "C:\Master\cat2.dta" 
drop _merge movie 
rename movie1 movie 
order respid movie valuation cat 
reshape wide valuation, i(respid cat) j(movie) 
save "C:\Master\cat2_all.dta", replace 
 
local varnum=15 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
recast double valuation`i' 
} 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
replace valuation`i'=. if valuation`i'==0 | valuation`i'==1 
gen lvaluation`i'=ln(valuation`i') 
} 
  
* Create a matrix with correlation coefficients and covariance 
 
matrix C = I(`varnum') 
matrix V = I(`varnum') 
 
* Correlation matrix C 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
 forvalues j=1(1)`i'{  
 capture  corr lvaluation`i' lvaluation`j' 
 
* Get the correlation and results, if there has not been error  
 if _rc==0{ 
 
* Rho is the correlation 
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matrix C[`i',`j']=r(rho) 
 matrix C[`j',`i']=r(rho) 
 } 
  
else{ 
* If correlation had an error, set results to missing values 
   
matrix C[`i',`j']=. 
  matrix C[`j',`i']=. 
 } 
* Set appropriate values on the diagonal 
  
matrix C[`i',`i']=1 
 } 
} 
 
* Covariance matrix V 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
 forvalues j=1(1)`i'{  
 capture  corr lvaluation`i' lvaluation`j', cov 
 
* Get the covariance and results, if there has not been an error 
 
 if _rc==0{ 
 
* Cov_12 is the covariance 
 
 matrix V[`i',`j']=r(cov_12) 
 matrix V[`j',`i']=r(cov_12) 
 } 
 else{ 
 
* If correlation had an error sets results to missing values 
   
matrix V[`i',`j']=. 
  matrix V[`j',`i']=. 
 } 
 } 
} 
 
 
* Vector with all the expected values 
 
matrix accum M=lvaluation*, means(M) noconstant 
mat list M 
 
drop respid cat 
 
* Simulate data with observations from 5000 “respondents” 
 
clear 
drawnorm lny1-lny15, n(5000) cov(V) means(M) forcepsd 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
gen y`i'=exp(lny`i') 
} 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
replace y`i'=int(y`i') 
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} 
 
gen n=_n 
sort n 
save "C:\Master\sim_data.dta", replace 
 
* Simulate the probability of positive/zero valuation 
 
clear 
clear matrix 
use "C:\Master\cat2_all.dta", replace 
local varnum=15 
 
forvalues i=1(1)`varnum' { 
replace valuation`i'=0 if valuation`i'==0 
replace valuation`i'=1 if valuation`i'>0 
} 
 
* Create matrix with correlation coefficients  
 
matrix V = I(`varnum') 
 
forvalues i=1(1)15 { 
 probit valuation`i' 
 
* Vector of means 
  
gen b`i'=_b[_cons] 
} 
 
matrix accum M=b*, means(M) noconstant 
mat list M 
 
 
foreach i of numlist 1(1)`varnum' { 
 foreach j of numlist 1(1)`i'{ 
 while `i'<`j' { 
 biprobit valuation`i' valuation`j' 
 
* Get correlation and results – rho is the correlation 
 
 matrix V[`i',`j']=e(rho) 
 matrix V[`j',`i']=e(rho) 
 
* Put appropriate values on the diagonal 
 
 matrix V[`i',`i']=1 
 } 
 } 
} 
 
 
matrix accum M=b*, means(M) noconstant 
mat list M 
 
clear 
drawnorm z1-z15, n(5000) cov(V) means(M) forcepsd 
 
* Create 0/1 outcome if z_i is less/more then zero 
 
foreach i of numlist 1(1)15 { 
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replace z`i'=0 if z`i'<=0 
replace z`i'=1 if z`i'>0 
} 
 
foreach i of numlist 1(1)15 { 
su z`i' 
} 
 
gen n=_n 
sort n 
merge n using "C:\Master\sim_data.dta" 
assert _merge==3 
drop _merge 
 
* Drop the outliers – observations with values over 6*SD (standard 
deviation) 
 
foreach i of numlist 1(1)15 { 
replace lny`i'=lny`i'*z`i' 
replace y`i'=y`i'*z`i' 
drop z`i' 
su y`i'  
drop if y`i'>6*r(sd) 
} 
 
foreach i of numlist 1(1)15 { 
su y`i'  
} 
 
 
save "C:\Master\sim_data_cat2.dta", replace 
 
set dp comma 
outsheet using "C:\Master\simulert_data_cat2_excel.csv" , comma nolabel 
replace 
 
 
